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The 1949 Common Program set the new state's economic line as "consideration for both public and private interests, mutual benefit for labor and capital." In the early years, private industry and commerce held a substantial share of the economy, especially in light industry, textiles and distribution. The CCP's policy toward national capital was "utilize and restrict": relying on private firms to restore production, collect taxes and provide jobs, while steadily bringing them under state planning through processing orders, unified purchase and sales, and agency distribution — the lower forms of state capitalism.

In 1953 the Party announced the general line for the transitional period: from the founding of the PRC to the completion of socialist transformation, the Party would "gradually realize the socialist industrialization of the country, and gradually realize the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce." This "one industrialization, three transformations" line meant the disappearance of private business was only a matter of time. In June 1953, based on a United Front investigation, the Center drafted the "Opinions on Utilizing, Restricting and Transforming Capitalist Industry and Commerce," establishing the policy framework.

The 1952 Three-Anti/Five-Anti Campaign was the prelude. In the Five-Anti, capitalists were forced to confess "illegal" gains, pay back taxes and fines; many, unable to endure the struggle sessions, killed themselves. The campaign destroyed industrialists' will to resist, politically and psychologically — when the 1955 call for industry-wide joint ownership came, almost no one dared say no publicly. The suicide of Lu Zuofu, founder of the Minsheng shipping company, on February 8, 1952, epitomized this atmosphere of terror.

Mao Zedong was the supreme decision-maker; Chen Yun designed the policy mechanics.

Mao's decision chain:

• June 15, 1953: Mao first fully stated the Party's general line for the transition period at an enlarged Politburo meeting — "basically accomplish national industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce within 10–15 years or a bit longer."
• December 1953: the line finalized; February 1954 (7th Plenum) and September 1954 (1st NPC, written into the Constitution) formally adopted. The "one industrialization, three transformations" line meant, in substance, "the state seizing all means of production."
• September 2, 1954: the State Council passed the Interim Regulations on Joint Public-Private Operation.
• November 1955: the Center convened provincial party chiefs to intensify whole-trade joint operation — the direct mobilization order for the 1956 climax.
• 1956: the Resolution on the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce set the "redemption" (not confiscation) policy.

Chen Yun's role:

• Architect of unified purchase and sale: his October 1953 speeches led to the October 16 resolution and November 23 State Council order. The grain monopoly cut off private business's raw materials and markets — the economic noose forcing firms into joint operation.
• Designer of "redemption": the "four-horse division of profits" (the capitalist getting 25%) and the fixed-interest (5% annual) system came from his economic apparatus.

Note: the CCP's official narrative (1981 Resolution on History) calls the line "entirely correct." This archive records the decisions, not the official verdict.

1953–1954: lower state capitalism. The state imposed processing orders, unified purchase and sales, and agency distribution on private firms. Their raw-material supply and sales channels grew dependent on the state; managerial autonomy shrank steadily. Scholars note the transition was "gradual, not abrupt": supportive in 1949–1952, restrictive after 1953 — and in competition with the public sector, private firms were doomed, "because the public sector had state power behind it."

September 2, 1954: the State Council passed the Provisional Regulations on Joint Public-Private Ownership, institutionalizing partnership enterprise by enterprise. Profits were split "four ways": state income tax, enterprise reserve, workers' welfare fund, and capitalist dividends — roughly a quarter each.

Late 1955: riding the rural collectivization upsurge, cities saw a trend toward industry-wide joint ownership. In November the Center convened Party chiefs of all provinces and municipalities to tighten leadership over the drive.

November 24, 1955: the 6th Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee adopted the Draft Resolution on the Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce — the programmatic document for the full push. In December, 42 Shanghai booksellers jointly wrote the municipal industry association requesting industry-wide partnership — in that political atmosphere, such "requests" were typically mobilized.

January 10, 1956: Beijing became the first city to declare industry-wide joint ownership complete. January 15: over 200,000 people rallied in Tiananmen Square to celebrate; Mao and other leaders attended as Mayor Peng Zhen proclaimed: "Our capital has entered socialist society." Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Xi'an, Chongqing, Shenyang and 50-plus medium cities followed.

The fixed-interest system. Redemption of capitalist shares switched to fixed interest at a uniform 0.5% per annum. The means of production were allocated by the state; capitalists, apart from the interest, would "no longer exercise authority as capitalists, and be remolded through labor into self-supporting workers." The rate was one-size-fits-all, regardless of profitability or shareholders' wishes.

End of 1956: the transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce was basically complete; private ownership of the means of production was essentially eliminated in mainland China.

September 1966: the fixed-interest term expired; the government stopped payments, and joint enterprises became fully socialist, people-owned enterprises — "stocks nationalized overnight," as people put it. In January 1979 the Center allowed collection of unpaid pre-September-1966 dividends, but the Finance Ministry ruled the same year that share capital would not be refunded. February 1983: the United Front Department and Ministry of Commerce jointly decreed that joint-ownership assets "already belong to the state and shall not be returned." Subsequent private-share lawsuits all failed on the basis of these documents.

The official narrative stresses "voluntary application" and "peaceful redemption." But the "voluntariness" of the time was manufactured through layered political mobilization: industry associations and United Front cadres visited every household, street and trade groups held meetings to "raise consciousness," and delivering applications "with gongs and drums" became political theater. In the shadow of the 1952 Five-Anti — in which masses of capitalists were struggled against, fined, taxed and driven to suicide — almost no one dared refuse to be "voluntary."

Economic strangulation was equally lethal. Under unified purchase and sales, private firms that stayed out could not obtain planned raw materials, bank loans or processing orders; business became impossible. The "choice" was partnership or slow death. Shanghai's private publishing industry is representative: by end-1955, "23 publishers shut down on their own decision, 121 ceased after government persuasion, 21 were forced to close" (scholar citing archives) — all absorbed into joint ownership. Shanghai published 5,711 book titles in 1955; its market share then declined steadily, ceding its publishing-center status to Beijing.

After partnership, capitalists lost all managerial authority. The fixed interest was one-size-fits-all: regardless of profitability or shareholders' wishes, everyone received 0.5% on assessed share value. Guangzhou's Wong Lo Kat pharmaceutical factory is often cited officially as a "model of cooperation" — yet even there, the fixed interest fell far below actual profits, even below bank deposit rates. The "redemption" price was set unilaterally by the buyer. Intangible assets — trademarks, goodwill, brand names — were taken without compensation, seeding the "time-honored brand" property disputes of the reform era.

Lu Zuofu (1893–1952) founded the Minsheng shipping company and organized the Yichang evacuation during the war — rushing 15,000-plus people and vast materiel up the Yangtze into Sichuan, hailed as "China's Dunkirk." Mao once named him among industrialists China "must not forget." After 1949 he refused Taiwan and America, returned to the mainland carrying sleeping pills, and volunteered his company for joint ownership. But under the crushing pressure of the Three-Anti Campaign, on February 8, 1952 — on the eve of formal partnership — Lu swallowed the pills he had carried from Hong Kong. Xinhua called it "suicide out of guilt." An entrepreneur who spent his life "building public assets, not private ones" died at the very institutional turning point he had welcomed. Minsheng went on to become a "model" of joint ownership.

Rong Yiren (1916–2005) inherited the Wuxi Rong family empire — Shenxin textiles, Fuxin flour — icons of modern Chinese national industry, the "Flour King" and "Cotton Yarn King." In the Three/Five-Anti he was forced to confess "illegal gains"; independent media report the demanded figure was raised from 28 billion to an astronomical 2.096 trillion (unverified) — he admitted he could never pay, and "when there was no way out, hanging was the only option." In the end he handed over the entire Rong enterprise, dignified as joint ownership, buying his life. The Cultural Revolution spared him nothing: Red Guards broke his right index finger and blinded one eye; he was sent to stoke boilers and scrub toilets. In 1979 Deng Xiaoping asked him to found CITIC; in 1993 he became Vice President — the model "red capitalist." But the official narrative hides the other side: from surrendering the family fortune in 1956 to bodily torment in the Cultural Revolution, the so-called "voluntariness" and "cooperation" always unfolded under the shadow of violence.

Execution chain: Mao set the tone → the Center/State Council legislated → Chen Yun's economic apparatus (unified purchase, processing orders — cutting off their lifeline) → local party committees organized "applications" → the Federation of Industry and Commerce mobilized → public-side cadres took over management.

The two-step strangulation:

• Lower state capitalism: unified purchase and processing orders — the state monopolized raw materials and sales channels; private firms lost independent operation.
• Higher state capitalism: single-firm joint operation → whole-trade joint operation. Public-side directors and managers took the boards; "managerial power shifted from private to public hands."

The 1956 climax: January 10 — Beijing first; January 15 — 200,000+ at Tiananmen, Mao attending; January 20 — Shanghai announced all 100,000+ private firms in joint operation.

"Redemption" in practice: the "four-horse division" (capitalists 25%); flat 5% fixed interest for 109 months, stopped September 1966 — the firms "finally transformed into socialist ownership by the whole people."

Outright confiscation after 1966: "without any legal procedure, private shares were confiscated as state property." 1979 and 1983 documents: "already state property, shall not be returned." Every subsequent lawsuit failed.

1. Capitalists who died resisting:

• Lu Zuofu: Minsheng Company founder, organizer of the Yichang evacuation. Suicide by sleeping pills, February 8, 1952; Xinhua called it "suicide out of guilt." He had volunteered for joint operation — and still died in the Three-Anti campaign.
• Xian Guansheng: founder of Guan Sheng Yuan; besieged in his office by workers for two days, jumped to his death April 21, 1952.
• Le Shaohua (Deng Xiaoping's brother-in-law): wrongly denounced in the Three-Anti, suicide January 15, 1952.
• Shanghai's "paratroopers" (the era's euphemism for jumpers): Mayor Chen Yi reportedly asked each morning "how many paratroopers yesterday?" Many of Shanghai's 876 suicides were "whole families of merchants and capitalists together."

2. The "three stops" resistance: during the Five-Anti, capitalists countered with work stoppages, wage stoppages, meal stoppages — 1,099 disputes involving 41,953 people in Shanghai (February 25–March 18, 1952). The authorities' counter: a February 3, 1952 order forbidding private-firm heads from leaving, closing shop, or withholding wages — locking every exit by decree.

3. Dissent inside the system: Luo Longji (China Democratic League vice-chair) proposed in May 1957 that the NPC and CPPCC form a "redress committee" to review Three-Anti/Five-Anti/Sufan errors. Mao immediately labeled him a Rightist; he died in 1965, never rehabilitated.

4. The other side of "cooperation" — Rong Yiren: the official "red capitalist" who "took the lead" in 1954; an alternative account (social media, unverified) says he was squeezed in the Five-Anti and surrendered his empire to survive. Both shown; the latter lacks reliable sourcing.

5. Belated property claims: since 1983, descendants' lawsuits for private shares have all failed under the 1983 "already state property, shall not be returned" rule. Scholars ask: if paying fixed interest acknowledged private equity, stopping payment didn't make it state property overnight.

The end of private ownership in mainland China. From 1956 until Reform and Opening in 1978, no legal private industry or commerce existed on the mainland — 22 years. It remains the only period in Chinese history when private property rights were systematically eliminated.

The destruction of the entrepreneurial class. Masses of industrialists were "remolded through labor into self-supporting workers"; business know-how, commercial networks and the spirit of contract were uprooted. When private enterprise re-emerged after 1978, it had to be rebuilt almost from zero — not unrelated to this history.

The ownership foundation for the planned economy. With public ownership dominant, the state could impose comprehensive mandatory planning. What followed was the 1958 Great Leap Forward — once every enterprise answered to state allocation, the institutional conditions for an economic catastrophe were in place.

Unresolved property claims echo today. Trademarks, goodwill and brand names seized without compensation in the 1950s became the root of "time-honored brand" disputes in the reform era. When Xinhua revived and glorified "joint public-private ownership" in 2026, it triggered fresh anxiety among private entrepreneurs under the "common prosperity" slogan — history has not receded.

• Chinese Wikipedia: 公私合营 — with historical photos including the 1956 Tiananmen celebration
• English Wikipedia entry — with images and references