The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, 1995–2025: Forty Closed Rounds, the Record of Rounds 37 to 40, and the Argument over Whether It Works
This page records in full the history of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue since its launch in 1995: the only dedicated human rights consultation mechanism between the European Union and China moved from two rounds a year to one, was suspended from 2020 to 2022 and resumed in 2023, and held its 40th round in Brussels on 13 June 2025, where the EU side named Jimmy Lai, Chow Hang-tung and other detainees for release, while civil society criticism of the dialogue's effectiveness and the EU's defence of keeping a channel of engagement open continue side by side.
1. Introduction: a mechanism that has lasted thirty years, and been disputed for thirty years
The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue began in 1995, with the first round held in Beijing. It is the only dedicated human rights consultation mechanism between the European Union and China: apart from it, there is no second standing channel between the two sides devoted to human rights alone. In its early years the dialogue met twice a year; it later moved to one round a year, alternating between Brussels and venues in China. Its format was fixed from the beginning: it is held behind closed doors, produces no joint statement, and the EU side issues a unilateral press release after each round setting out its own position, while the Chinese side usually confines itself to brief foreign ministry remarks. The EU delegation is chaired by the Deputy Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific of the European External Action Service, and the Chinese delegation by the Director-General of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences of the foreign ministry, with EU member states attending as observers. Over thirty years and forty rounds, that format has barely changed.
The unchanging format corresponds to an unchanging dispute. Defenders of the dialogue argue that it is the only standing channel through which the EU can put specific cases, specific laws and specific concerns to the Chinese side face to face, and that its existence allows names such as Jimmy Lai, Chow Hang-tung and Ilham Tohti to be formally handed across the table to a Chinese delegation, leaving a public trace in the EU's own press releases. Critics answer that thirty years of dialogue have produced no measurable results: no benchmarks, no accountability, no public Chinese commitments, while the post-round press releases repeat similar concerns year after year and conditions in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong continue to deteriorate. In June 2024 five international human rights organisations wrote jointly to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, stating that the dialogue had been amply proven to be ineffective and calling for it to be suspended. This page sets out the mechanism's history, a round-by-round record of the most recent four rounds, and both the criticism and the defence in full, and leaves readers to judge what forty rounds have actually left behind.
The factual basis of this page is principally the press releases issued by the European External Action Service after each round, supplemented by public statements at EU-China summits, a statement by the EU Delegation to China, and the open letter from human rights organisations. The asymmetry of the information structure must be stated: because the dialogue is held behind closed doors and produces no joint statement, the public record comes almost entirely from the EU side's unilateral releases, and China's itemised replies within each round are rarely public beyond brief foreign ministry remarks. Wherever this page reports a Chinese reply given inside the room, it identifies the report as the EU press release's account of it. Wherever no public record exists, this page says so rather than filling the gap with conjecture. That grading of evidence is indispensable when reading the archive of any closed-door dialogue.
2. Origins and development: from the first round in 1995 to the 37th round in 2019
When the first EU-China Human Rights Dialogue was held in Beijing in 1995, EU-China relations were organised mainly around trade and economic cooperation, and the creation of the dialogue itself carried an element of exchange: a standing consultation in place of public condemnation became the basic pattern of European human rights diplomacy towards China for many years. The dialogue met twice a year in its early period and later once a year, alternating between Brussels and Chinese cities. The arrangement gave human rights a permanent institutional place in EU-China relations, and at the same time kept it inside a closed meeting room: European Parliament resolutions and UN discussions of China are public, while the content of the dialogue, beyond the EU's post-round press releases, cannot be checked item by item by outsiders. The verified material underlying this page does not list the date, venue and agenda of every round between 1995 and 2018, and this page does not reconstruct round-by-round detail from memory; it records only the established facts of the mechanism's development, so that unverified round information does not enter the archive.
The dialogue's personnel and procedural framework remained stable in recent rounds: chaired on the EU side by the Deputy Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific of the European External Action Service, and on the Chinese side by the Director-General of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences of the foreign ministry, with member states attending as observers. That level of representation itself defines the dialogue's place: it is a working-level consultation channel, not a decision-making occasion at summit or ministerial level. The EU's agenda list has also been stable year after year: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, individual cases of prisoners of conscience, the death penalty, forced labour, religious freedom and judicial independence, among others. The stability of that list testifies both to the continuity of the EU's position and, from the other side, to the fact that these questions remain unresolved year after year; had they been settled, the list would long ago have carried new items.
The 37th round was held in Brussels on 1 and 2 April 2019, the last regular round before the pandemic and the sanctions crisis. EU-China relations then suffered successive shocks: the Covid pandemic suspended much face-to-face diplomacy, and in March 2021 the EU imposed sanctions on China over Xinjiang, China retaliated against members of the European Parliament and EU bodies, relations cooled across the board, and the human rights dialogue froze with them. No round was held in 2020, 2021 or 2022. That suspension is the essential background to the 38th round: the resumption in 2023 was not the continuation of a routine schedule but an agreement, reached while the sanctions stand-off remained unresolved, to reconnect at least this most specialised of channels.
3. Suspension and resumption: the 38th round on 17 February 2023
The 38th round of the dialogue was held in Brussels on 17 February 2023. It was the first round since the reciprocal sanctions crisis of 2021, almost four years after the 37th round of 2019. The EU side raised Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, individual cases of prisoners of conscience, the death penalty and forced labour, among other subjects. Judging by the agenda the EU published after the round, the first resumed session did not trim its list out of regard for a thaw in relations; the EU placed the concerns accumulated during the suspension on the table at once. The material underlying this page does not give the names of the two chairs at the 38th round or China's itemised replies, and this page records that absence of a public itemised record honestly rather than supplying names or quotations.
The significance of the 38th round was mainly procedural. It demonstrated one thing: even with sanctions and counter-sanctions in force and the European Parliament's scrutiny of the investment agreement frozen, both sides were still willing to keep a dedicated human rights channel. But procedural resumption is not substantive progress. In the two years that followed, no item on the EU's published list of cases and concerns was reported to have been resolved because of the dialogue. It was precisely that condition, a channel restored with nothing to show for it, that produced civil society's sharpest criticism in 2024. Seen in the thirty-year line, the 38th round is evidence of the mechanism's resilience and of its predicament at once: the dialogue can be interrupted for three years and resume in its original form, while its agenda returns unchanged, as if neither the suspension nor the resumption had left a mark on substance.
4. The 39th round in 2024: Chongqing, the Tibet visit and the letter from five organisations
The 39th round was held in Chongqing on 16 June 2024, co-chaired on the EU side by Paola Pampaloni, Deputy Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific of the European External Action Service, and on the Chinese side by Shen Bo, Director-General of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences of the foreign ministry. The round had a fuller programme than usual. From 13 to 15 June, before the round, the EU delegation visited Tibet, travelling to Lhasa and Nyingchi and visiting boarding schools, religious sites and a prison, but was not able to meet detainees in private. On 17 June the EU side held discussions in Beijing with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Beijing Institute of Technology, and Assistant Foreign Minister Miao Deyu met the delegation. The Tibet visit was the most watched element of the round, and its limitation, that no private meetings with detainees were possible, was likewise written into the EU's public record: what was visited and what could not be done both appear in the EU's press release, and this page records them side by side in the release's own terms.
On substance, the EU statement reiterated its concern at what it described as the very serious human rights situation in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, raised individual cases with demands for release, including the Tibetans Go Sherab Gyatso and Dorjee Tashi, and stressed that the selection of religious leaders, including the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, should not be subject to government interference. The very serious formulation follows the wording of the EU statement and is relayed here as the position of a party to the dialogue. Individual naming is the dialogue's most concrete form of output: it reduces general concern to particular names, so that the Chinese side cannot answer that the subject does not exist and must respond to the cases themselves. It must equally be recorded that the EU press release shows no commitment by the Chinese side at the meeting to release or review those cases, and no itemised Chinese reply is in the public record, as this page notes where relevant.
Four days before the round, on 12 June 2024, five international human rights organisations wrote jointly to Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative, criticising the dialogue as amply proven to be ineffective: 38 rounds had produced no measurable results, no benchmarks and no accountability, and they called for the dialogue to be suspended and replaced by stronger measures. That letter is civil society's most systematic rejection of the mechanism, and the structure of its argument deserves full record: it attacks not the conduct of any single round but the design of the mechanism itself, holding that a closed process without benchmarks, accountability or public commitments is bound to produce nothing that can be tested. The EU did not accept the call for suspension, and the 39th round went ahead in Chongqing as scheduled. This page records both sides: the letter's criticism is set out in its own terms and attributed to the five international human rights organisations, and the EU's decision to proceed, with its public record of cases raised, is equally on the record. The order of events must be clear: the criticism came first, the round followed, and the EU chose to continue in full knowledge of what the criticism said.
5. The 40th round in 2025: the Brussels case list and the agreement on a next round
The 40th round was held in Brussels on 13 June 2025, and the European External Action Service issued its press release on 14 June. There was a procedural detail beforehand: on 11 June the EU side visited South Tyrol in Italy to study the protection of minority languages, an arrangement widely read as the EU preparing a reference point from its own experience of minority autonomy and language protection for the minority-rights items on the dialogue agenda. The agenda covered fundamental freedoms, labour rights, judicial independence, economic and social rights, the death penalty, religious freedom and the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, and information on the Panchen Lama thirty years after his disappearance, among other subjects. On the death penalty the EU stated its firm opposition and demanded a moratorium on executions and transparency of data. On religion it continued to stress that the selection of religious leaders should not be subject to government interference, and it asked for information on the Panchen Lama three decades after he disappeared.
The most concrete part of the 40th round was its list of cases. The EU side demanded the immediate and unconditional release of Jimmy Lai and Chow Hang-tung, and, as confirmed by correspondence from the European External Action Service, raised in detail in the meeting the cases of Ilham Tohti, Gulshan Abbas and Rahila Dawut, among others. The Chinese reply, as recorded by the EU side, was that requests for phone calls submitted in writing would be considered in accordance with the law: a procedural answer that contains no commitment to release, recorded here in its actual scope, neither inflated nor diminished. The two sides agreed to hold the next round in China in 2026. As of this page's latest review in November 2026, no specific date or venue for that next round has been publicly announced, and this page records it as still to be set rather than writing arrangements in advance.
Comparing the lists of the 40th and 39th rounds shows both continuity and extension in the dialogue's agenda. The case of Jimmy Lai moved from the European Parliament's resolution line into the formal list of the human rights dialogue; Chow Hang-tung was named; the cases of Uyghur scholars and detainees were raised in detail; and thirty years of the Panchen Lama's disappearance entered the agenda. Once those names are in an EU press release they become items that cannot be avoided in official EU-China exchanges. It must equally be recorded that, as of this page's review, not one person on the list has been released because of the dialogue. The dialogue's output is record, not release; that judgement holds for the 40th round and broadly for the thirty-nine before it, and this page returns to it in its assessment below.
6. Latest state: the 2025 summit, the Human Rights Day statement and the unresolved questions
After the 40th round, the EU carried the same concerns to a higher level. At the 25th EU-China Summit in Beijing on 24 July 2025, the EU side again raised Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and human rights defenders. The dialogue is therefore not an isolated channel: the subjects raised in it are restated at summit level, and the summit-level restatement has likewise been accompanied by no public record of Chinese concessions. On 10 December 2025, International Human Rights Day, the EU Delegation to China issued a statement saying that in the engagement of the past year the human rights situation in China had seen no substantive improvement. That judgement, no substantive improvement, is the EU's summary assessment of a full year of engagement, taken from the wording of the EU Delegation's statement and relayed here as a party's position. Set against the 40th round held in the middle of that year, it forms a telling pair: the channel was working, and the judgement was no improvement, and the EU wrote both facts into the public record itself.
The latest state recorded on this page can therefore be summarised in three points. First, the mechanism continues: the two sides have agreed to hold the next round in China in 2026, and the dialogue will not end of itself after the 40th round. Second, the criticism continues: the three charges in the five organisations' letter of 2024, no results, no benchmarks and no accountability, have received no itemised public answer from the EU, and no document setting benchmarks or accountability arrangements for the dialogue appears in the public record within the scope of this page's review. Third, the cases remain unresolved: Go Sherab Gyatso, Dorjee Tashi, Jimmy Lai, Chow Hang-tung, Ilham Tohti, Gulshan Abbas and Rahila Dawut, named in the 39th and 40th rounds, have none of them been reported released because of the dialogue as of November 2026. This page will follow the holding of the 2026 round and the EU's press release on it, and will record substantively any setting of benchmarks, progress in cases, or change to the mechanism.
7. Documents and procedure index
The official and public documents covered by this page are indexed in chronological order. First, the establishment of the mechanism: the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue began in 1995, with the first round in Beijing, as the only dedicated human rights consultation mechanism between the EU and China. Second, the record of the 37th round: Brussels, 1 and 2 April 2019, the last round before the suspension. Third, the record of the 38th round: Brussels, 17 February 2023, with the European External Action Service press release recording that the EU raised Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, individual cases of prisoners of conscience, the death penalty and forced labour. Fourth, the record of the 39th round: Chongqing, 16 June 2024, with the Service's press release recording the names of the co-chairs, the Tibet visit arrangements and the case demands, together with the joint letter of 12 June 2024 from five international human rights organisations to Josep Borrell. Fifth, the record of the 40th round: Brussels, 13 June 2025, with the Service's press release of 14 June 2025 and its confirming correspondence on the cases raised. Sixth, the follow-up documents: the EU's statements at the 25th EU-China Summit on 24 July 2025 and the EU Delegation to China's International Human Rights Day statement of 10 December 2025.
The procedural points are indexed as follows. The dialogue is held behind closed doors and produces no joint statement; the EU issues a unilateral press release after each round and the Chinese side usually confines itself to brief foreign ministry remarks. The EU chair is the Deputy Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific of the European External Action Service, the Chinese chair is the Director-General of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences of the foreign ministry, and member states attend as observers. The dialogue met twice a year in its early period and later once a year, alternating between Brussels and China; no round was held in 2020, 2021 or 2022. This page invents no dates or venues for the early rounds: round-by-round records for 1995 to 2018 do not appear in the verified material for this page and are left blank with that explanation rather than filled from memory. The full list of the five organisations behind the joint letter is not set out in the brief, and this page records them only under the collective description of five international human rights organisations, without inventing institutional names.
8. Verification note
The dates and venues of the rounds recorded on this page, the 37th round in Brussels on 1 and 2 April 2019, the 38th in Brussels on 17 February 2023, the 39th in Chongqing on 16 June 2024 and the 40th in Brussels on 13 June 2025, are reproduced without alteration from the European External Action Service press release record as compiled in this batch's fact brief. The names of the 39th round co-chairs, Paola Pampaloni and Shen Bo, the case list of the 40th round and the Chinese side's procedural reply are likewise recorded as given in the brief. The date of the five organisations' joint letter, 12 June 2024, its addressee Josep Borrell, and its core criticism, that the dialogue had been amply proven to be ineffective with no measurable results, no benchmarks and no accountability, are relayed in the brief's terms and attributed throughout as the position of those five organisations, not presented as a neutral conclusion; the brief does not list the five organisations by name and this page invents no list. The content of the dialogue rests principally on the EU side's unilateral press releases, and wherever no public record of an itemised Chinese reply exists this page has said so. No single quotation exceeds fifty words. This page was last reviewed in November 2026, and statements of current status are made as of that date.
Our Take
Any assessment of forty rounds has to start from a simple comparison. The EU's lists of cases have grown longer and more specific, from subjects to names, from Jimmy Lai and Chow Hang-tung to Ilham Tohti and Rahila Dawut, and not one person on those lists has walked out of prison because of the dialogue. The five human rights organisations say the dialogue does not work, and the evidence is there. The EU insists the dialogue has value, on the ground that if the channel closed there would not even be an occasion to hand the lists across the table. Both claims rest on facts; the disagreement is over the standard. Judged by releases and improvement, the dialogue fails. Judged by contact and record, it barely survives. This site's position is that the standard should be stated before the verdict: when a human rights mechanism has run for thirty years and can still defend itself only by saying that at least we are still talking, talking itself has already turned from a means into the purpose.
This site equally declines to write the dialogue off as worthless. On 10 December 2025 the EU Delegation to China itself wrote that there had been no substantive improvement, and that honesty is a judgement accumulated through channels of engagement that include the dialogue; the case lists in the press release of the 40th round have likewise become part of the human rights archive that all sides cite. The real problem was never whether to talk, but whether anything stands behind the talking. Parliament's resolutions call for sanctions every year and the Council never answers, and the sanctions list has stood still since 2021. The dialogue looks ineffective partly because its closed form inherently produces little, and partly because the public instruments of pressure are left idle by the Council, so that the names handed over behind closed doors carry no cost behind them. This archive records both the forty rounds of names and the thirty years of silence, and those who one day judge European human rights diplomacy towards China in this period will be able to see clearly at which level the responsibility lies.
9. Supplementary record: the division of labour between dialogue, resolutions and sanctions
The dialogue can only be placed correctly when it is set within the full range of the EU's human rights instruments towards China. The EU has three tools of different kinds. Resolutions of the European Parliament are public, name names, and are not binding; their work is record and pressure. Sanctions of the Council have legal force and impose real costs, but they require the unanimity of member states and carry the highest threshold. The human rights dialogue is closed, working-level and produces no public commitments; its work is to hand over cases face to face and keep contact alive. Within this site's International Official Records section, the pages on the EU's 2021 sanctions on China and on the European Parliament's Xinjiang and Hong Kong resolutions correspond to the first two tools, and this page to the third. Over four years the three tools have settled into a fixed pattern: Parliament speaks every year, sanctions stopped in 2021, and the dialogue meets every year. The institution that speaks most often holds no power of decision, the Council that holds the power is the most silent, and the dialogue runs between them on a line that neither breaks nor produces results.
The reciprocal sanctions of 2021 were a stress test of the relationship between the three tools. The EU sanctioned Xinjiang officials; China retaliated against members of the European Parliament and EU bodies; Parliament froze scrutiny of the investment agreement; and the human rights dialogue was suspended for three years. The order of restoration is worth noting: the dialogue was restored first, in 2023; interparliamentary contact resumed later; and the sanctions remain in place. In the practical ordering of both sides, the dialogue is evidently the cheapest channel and the easiest to restore, precisely because it produces no public commitments and no legal consequences, so both sides can afford to let it continue. That observation is not a dismissal of the dialogue but a statement of the ceiling on its function: a mechanism whose survival depends on its low cost can hardly be expected to produce high-cost outcomes.
For the families of individual cases and those who campaign for them, the practical significance of the dialogue often lies in the few lines of an EU press release: a name formally raised, a reply placed on record. Those records are cited by lawyers, human rights organisations and journalists and become part of a case file. This page reproduces the case lists of the 39th and 40th rounds in full for exactly that reason: the contents of a closed meeting disperse, but the names in a press release do not. If the EU ever changes the form of the dialogue, by setting benchmarks, publishing Chinese commitments, or suspending it, this page will record the change substantively and at once, because that would be the first time in thirty years that the mechanism altered its own nature.