Xu Qinxian's Refusal: The 38th Army Commander Who Demanded a Written Martial-Law Order
Xu Qinxian, commander of the 38th Group Army, refused a verbal martial-law order on 19 May 1989, served five years, and died under surveillance in Shijiazhuang in 2021.
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Xu Qinxian (August 1935 – 8 January 2021), a native of Ye County, Shandong, now Laizhou, was a major general of the People's Liberation Army and commander of the 38th Group Army. On 19 May 1989, on the eve of the martial-law decision, he refused to carry out an order to lead his troops into Beijing that had been conveyed to him only verbally. He demanded to see a written order, argued that troops could not be moved into the capital on a spoken command when no state of war existed, asked for sick leave, and said this was something he could not do. He was removed as army commander and taken away from his hospital ward. In 1990 a military court of the Beijing Military Region tried him in camera for disobeying orders and sentenced him to five years in prison; he was also expelled from the Communist Party. His refusal did not stop the crackdown: the 38th Group Army entered Beijing under his successor and took part in the June suppression, the heaviest fact in this entire record. After his release he was settled in Shijiazhuang, Hebei, where he lived under surveillance for the rest of his life, barred from returning to Beijing. He died there on 8 January 2021, aged eighty-five; the authorities never announced his death. In 2025 the complete video of his 1990 trial surfaced, confirming the core fact that the order had been verbal and that no written document existed. This page records his career, refusal, trial, imprisonment, exile and the surfacing of the trial video to archive standard, with conflicting accounts set out side by side.
1. Early life and enlistment: from signaller to armoured commander
Xu Qinxian was born in August 1935 in Ye County, Shandong, the county now administered as Laizhou. Public sources record little about his family background, childhood or schooling, and this section states that plainly as a matter of no public record rather than speculate. The confirmed starting point is a young man's enlistment: he joined the army during the Korean War period and served first as a signaller, beginning his career at the most basic level of the communications trade. A signaller's work is to keep the chain of command connected, and researchers have often noted the irony that what Xu contested in 1989 was precisely a question about the chain of command, namely in what form an order moving a main-force group army into the capital must be issued before it counts as an order at all. Over decades of service he rose steadily through the ranks. In the 1980s he served successively as commander of the 1st Armoured Division, deputy commander of the 38th Group Army and then its commander, holding the rank of major general. That trajectory matters: he was not a marginal figure or a caretaker pushed forward at the last moment, but a professional soldier formed inside the system who knew unit operations and command procedure from the inside. His procedural objection in 1989 therefore carried professional weight. Demanding a written order was not a layman's quibble; it was the minimum requirement as understood by a group army commander applying ordinary command practice. The career details in this section rest on the common account in the English Wikipedia entry on Xu Qinxian and other published biographical sources; exact start and end months for each post differ between sources, so this page gives only the broadly agreed sequence and invents no month-precise dates.
2. The 38th Group Army: the main-force army guarding the capital region
To grasp the weight of Xu's refusal, one must first understand the position of the 38th Group Army. Stationed at Baoding in Hebei, it was among the best-equipped main-force group armies, charged with guarding the approaches to the capital. It was close to Beijing and highly mobile, so when the leadership considered using troops to impose martial law in the spring of 1989, this was one of the first formations that came to mind, and its commander's attitude would largely decide how it was committed. Xu was also close to Qin Jiwei, then minister of national defence, and multiple accounts record that Qin himself had reservations about using the army to suppress the student movement. This page registers that background at background grade: it helps readers see that Xu's hesitation was not isolated, and that senior levels of the military were not unanimous about solving a political problem with troops. At the same time this page stresses that closeness is not instruction, and no public evidence shows that Xu's refusal was made at anyone's direction. To recast his refusal as a factional move would erase the decision he made himself and the price he paid himself, five years in prison and lifelong exile. Qin Jiwei's specific words and actions in 1989 differ considerably between accounts; this page does not expand on them, recording only the widely shared outline that his attitude was ambiguous and reserved, with details marked unverified.
3. March to May 1989: in hospital, watching the movement
In March 1989 Xu Qinxian was admitted to the General Hospital of the Beijing Military Region. Public accounts give two explanations, and this page sets them side by side without forcing a choice: one holds that he had been injured in a hand-grenade training accident, an account found in retellings connected with his own statements at trial; the other holds that he was hospitalised for kidney stones, the account in historian Yang Jisheng's interview record. The fact of hospitalisation itself is agreed across sources; only the cause is disputed, and this page treats it accordingly. His stay coincided with the rise and spread of the Beijing student movement, and from his ward he followed its progress on television and in newspapers. Yang Jisheng records that Xu wept while watching television reports of the students' hunger strike and was deeply moved; that detail is flagged here as resting on Yang's account, an interview-based retelling, not as a fact verifiable from footage. In May the hunger strike sharply raised the tension, support for the students spread across the capital, and fierce argument broke out inside the leadership over whether to use troops and how to characterise the movement. A group army commander in hospital might have used convalescence to stand aside, and in fact he was in a ward rather than at a command post. But once a martial-law decision took shape, the chain of command would inevitably reach the army commander, and a hospital bed was no exemption. His later formal request for sick leave shows that he understood he had to give a definite answer, and the answer he gave was no. Descriptions of his state of mind in hospital on this page rely solely on Yang Jisheng's sourced line of reporting; all other speculation about his inner life is omitted, so that an archive does not turn into a novel.
4. 19 May 1989: refusal of a verbal order
19 May 1989 is the central date of this case and the sort date of this page. On that day, on the eve of the martial-law decision, the Beijing Military Region conveyed mobilisation and martial-law orders to Xu Qinxian and required him to declare his support. He refused to execute a verbal order and demanded to see a written one. According to multiple accounts, confirmed in substance by the trial video that surfaced in 2025, his reasoning had two cores, one procedural and one substantive. First, with no state of war in existence, troops could not be moved into the capital to enforce martial law on a spoken command; an operation of that magnitude required a formal written order. Second, he asked for sick leave and said this was something he could not do. The most widely circulated retelling has him saying, in effect, that he would rather be beheaded than become a sinner of history. This page treats that wording strictly: the exact phrasing belongs to retelling and is not used as a verbatim quotation. The trial video that surfaced in 2025 shows that his core formulation in court was a refusal to become a sinner of history, together with the insistence that the student movement was a political problem to be solved by political means; wording here follows the reporting on that video. The immediate effect of his refusal that day was to break the chain of command for moving the 38th Group Army at precisely his link: before the leadership could move the army, it first had to deal with its commander. Readers should see clearly that the surface dispute was about the form of an order, while the substance was the nature of the operation. The absence of a written order meant that no one was willing to leave an accountable signature behind, and what he refused was exactly that: an advance on the capital that no one would sign for, yet the army was expected to carry out. That distinction is the first key to the whole case.
5. After the refusal: removal, arrest, and the 38th Army enters Beijing
After his refusal, Xu Qinxian was taken away from the hospital and removed as commander of the 38th Group Army. Public sources hold no complete and consistent record of the exact date of his removal from the ward, the personnel who carried it out, or his first place of detention, and this page marks those points as matters of no public record rather than fill them with conjecture. The confirmable sequence is that the refusal came first, loss of command and loss of liberty followed, and he then entered military judicial process, ending in his trial in 1990. This page must record, in the heaviest terms, the boundary of what his refusal achieved: it did not stop the crackdown. The 38th Group Army entered Beijing under his successor and took part in the suppression of June 1989. In other words, one commander's conscientious decision changed his own fate but not his army's destination, and not the outcome in Beijing that June. That fact does not diminish the refusal; it defines its true scale. Inside a highly centralised command system, a single commander's refusal can be replaced at once, because the system keeps substitute men and substitute chains in reserve. Any telling that records the courage of the refusal but not the fact that the suppression happened anyway would be dishonest toward the dead. This archive therefore files the two facts side by side: the refusal is real, and so is the crackdown it failed to prevent, and the second is the historical weight the first could not lift. For decades afterwards Xu's name was comprehensively silenced on the mainland; official narrative contained neither his refusal nor his trial, as if the 38th Group Army had never changed commanders in 1989. That silence is itself part of this case's archive.
6. The 1990 trial: military court, the charge of disobedience, five years
In 1990 Xu Qinxian was brought to trial. Sources differ slightly in naming the court, generally giving a military court of the Beijing Military Region; this page writes military court and flags that detail as unverified. The trial was held in camera. He was convicted of disobeying orders and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, and he was expelled from the Communist Party. Public sources give only the year of the trial and no exact date, and this page invents none; that is also why the trial date is not entered in this site's On This Day calendar. The central dispute at trial, as the later-surfaced video and years of earlier retelling mutually confirm, was not complicated. The prosecution's position was that a soldier's duty is obedience, the order had been given, and refusal was disobedience. Xu's position was that the order had been conveyed only verbally, with no written document; that a movement of troops on that scale lacked the form that makes an order validly established; that the student movement was a political problem that should be resolved by political means rather than by the army under martial law; and that he refused to become a sinner of history. Set side by side, the trial was in truth trying not whether a soldier had been obedient, but whether an unsigned order is an order at all, and whether a political movement should be closed down by an army. The verdict is well known: the system chose the first answer. The five-year term is often compared with sentences in other cases arising from 1989; this page makes no cross-case sentencing inference and records only this case's facts, the charge, the term, the expulsion and the closed proceedings, on which sources agree. His exact words in court rested for decades on fragmentary retelling with varying wording; wherever this page touches his courtroom language, it follows the 2025 video reporting and flags its retold character.
7. Imprisonment: four years in Qincheng and a fifth in a police hospital, as recorded
The main public source for where and how Xu Qinxian served his sentence is the reporting of journalist Gao Yu and others, and this page presents it at that source grade, flagged as such. According to Gao Yu's account, he served the first four years in Qincheng Prison and the fifth year in a police hospital, which together make up the five-year term. Qincheng is the prison known for holding senior political prisoners and defendants in cases involving high officials, and his being sent there itself marked how the authorities graded this case: not an ordinary breach of military discipline, but a major political case. Details of his treatment, visits and health during imprisonment are sparse and fragmentary in public sources and are marked here as matters of no public record; no unverifiable rumour is used. The exact start of the term and the exact date of release have likewise never been published in any official document; the general account places his release at about 1995, and this page writes about 1995 and marks it explicitly as approximate. This section stands on its own because the five years are too often skipped over in refusal narratives, as if history's verdict followed the refusal directly. In reality they were five real years of lost liberty, from the age of fifty-four to sixty, consuming the last stretch of years in which he might still have acted in the world, spent between a prison and a hospital ward. Release did not restore freedom either. What awaited him was a further disposition with no name of a sentence: removal from Beijing, settlement in Shijiazhuang and long-term surveillance, which the next section records.
8. After release: settlement in Shijiazhuang, surveillance, no return to Beijing
After his release at about 1995, Xu Qinxian was settled in Shijiazhuang, Hebei, and spent the rest of his life in a residence for retired military cadres there. Published accounts often describe the arrangement as exile: Shijiazhuang is not far from Beijing, yet far enough to strip him completely from his former military and political networks and from the capital's circles. He lived in Shijiazhuang under surveillance and was not permitted to return to Beijing. The specific forms, responsible units and intensity of that surveillance are not systematically recorded in public sources and are marked here as matters of no public record; this page registers only the conclusion on which sources agree, long-term surveillance and the ban on returning to Beijing. His late years in Shijiazhuang almost never entered public view: no public activities, no published memoir, no interviews with overseas media. The single systematic exception was historian Yang Jisheng's interview with him, recorded in the next section. From 1989 to 2021 he vanished from the public world for thirty-two years. Those years are not a blank; they are part of this case's structure of punishment. The effect the authorities sought was not merely to sentence a man who disobeyed to five years, but to ensure that he never made another sound, so that anyone in the armed forces later searching for a precedent would find no such person. A major general who once commanded a main-force group army ended his life in enforced obscurity, and that ending belongs to the complete record of this case just as much as the five years in Qincheng. Details of his late-life health, family and daily life, beyond what the obituary reporting covers, have no reliable public record, and this archive does not excavate them.
9. The Yang Jisheng interview: the statement that he did not regret it
Around 2011, historian Yang Jisheng interviewed Xu Qinxian. The interview record was published in Hong Kong from 2013 and became the most important first-hand source for Xu's late-life attitude and for details of 1989. The kidney-stone account of his hospitalisation and the detail of his weeping at television reports, both used earlier in this page, come from this interview line and are flagged at each occurrence. According to the text Yang published, Xu said he did not regret his refusal of 1989. This page handles that statement as paraphrase, not verbatim quotation: the exact words stand in Yang's published version, and this page conveys only the core meaning, that he did not regret it, without excerpting more quotation than necessary. The interview matters on three levels. First, it confirms that twenty-two years later, knowing he remained under surveillance, the man himself did not recant and did not redescribe his refusal as a misunderstanding or an impulse. Second, it supplied a subject's own version entirely different from official silence, turning the refusal from rumour into a record with an interviewer, a place of publication and verifiability for later readers. Third, it shows the fragility of such records: the interview could be published only in Hong Kong, and to the end of his life Xu could not publicly tell his own story on the mainland. That a group army commander's only systematic account of the most consequential decision of his life had to travel through overseas publication to survive is itself the most direct footnote to the environment of speech in which he lived. Wherever this page uses Yang's interview, the source is flagged, and details found only there are presented at single-source grade.
10. Contemporary background: dissent inside the military and reservations at the top
Xu's refusal did not occur in complete silence. In May 1989 there were dissenting voices within the military and at senior levels over martial law. This section records that background only, with its evidence grade flagged, and does not let it upstage the subject. According to published accounts, in May 1989 a number of senior generals jointly signed a letter opposing martial law; the letter of the seven generals is the most widely recorded example, its gist being that the army must not fire on the people and that the student movement should not be handled by force. This page presents that at the grade of published accounts and does not quote any version of the letter verbatim, since versions differ. Defence Minister Qin Jiwei's attitude is described in multiple accounts as ambiguous and reserved, and his closeness to Xu has been recorded earlier in this page. The background shows that when the leadership pushed martial law forward, it faced not the army's collective endorsement but hesitation and resistance at several levels, including the commander of a front-line main-force army. That the suppression was nevertheless carried out owed nothing to consensus; it was achieved by replacing commanders, bypassing those who resisted and committing multiple formations by organisational means. This page must also draw a clear line: the joint letter and senior reservations are background, not the cause of Xu's refusal, and no public evidence proves any prior coordination among them. To write background as collusion would be unsupported, and it would diminish the independence with which each man bore his own risk. The archival method is to give each his place: the seven generals have their record, Qin Jiwei has his, and this page answers only for Xu Qinxian's decision, with the background honestly graded as published accounts and multiple retellings.
11. Death in 2021: Shijiazhuang, and official silence
Xu Qinxian died in Shijiazhuang, Hebei, on 8 January 2021, aged eighty-five. The news was reported by Hong Kong media, including Ming Pao, drawing on his family and informed sources. The authorities never issued any announcement: no obituary, no biographical summary, no military statement. That a major general and former commander of a main-force group army could die without a single official character being written about him continues, in a straight line, the thirty-two years of silencing he endured in life. Public reporting covers only a limited range regarding the cause of his death, his final days and his funeral arrangements; this page uses only the parts on which Hong Kong obituary reporting agrees and marks the rest as matters of no public record. His date of death, 8 January 2021, has a definite month and day, and this page therefore enters it in the On This Day calendar. His death prompted a round of retrospective coverage outside China, in which the refusal was again assembled and published by multiple outlets and researchers, while on the mainland the material remained blocked and deleted, and ordinary readers on domestic networks could not retrieve a complete record. His treatment after death and his exile in life form a closed loop: in life he could not return to Beijing; in death he could not keep his name. One direct purpose of this page is to break that loop, assembling fragments scattered across an interview, obituaries, trial retellings and scholarship into a complete archive with a timeline, sources and evidence grades, so that later readers can find Xu Qinxian's name together with his decision of 19 May 1989, and can check the one against the other.
12. 2025: the six-hour trial video surfaces
In 2025 this case received its most important new evidence in thirty-six years: the complete video of Xu Qinxian's 1990 military trial surfaced. Running to about six hours, it was uploaded to a video platform that is blocked in China. June Fourth scholar Wu Renhua and others circulated and identified the footage, viewing figures passed one million, and international outlets including The Guardian and Agence France-Presse reported the story. The video's archival value is that it turned core facts that had rested mainly on retelling into directly viewable primary footage: the order had been conveyed verbally and no written document existed, and Xu maintained in court that the student movement was a political problem to be solved by political means and that he refused to become a sinner of history. In other words, the claims that officials had dismissed as rumour for more than three decades, and whose doubters had demanded evidence, now had their evidence appear in the form of a trial video, drawn from the system's own court record. This site published a video page for the trial footage on 20 November 2026; this page registers only the fact of the video's surfacing and archiving and invents no internal link. The channel by which the video emerged and the identity of whoever supplied it have not been fully disclosed in public reporting and are marked here as matters of no public record, without speculation. Public reporting gives only the year and a second-half-of-the-year framing for the surfacing, with no exact date, so this page does not enter it in the On This Day calendar, in order to avoid inventing a date. After the video appeared, the authorities blocked the material inside mainland China, a response consistent with their handling since 1989. The fate of one archive thus forms a contrast: the same footage, watched by millions and identified frame by frame by scholars outside the wall, does not exist inside it. This page lists the surfacing of the video as the final turning point in the case's timeline, and notes that the story is still developing.
13. Verification note and evidence grading
The key facts of this page are graded as follows. Grade A, corroborated across multiple sources: Xu's birth and death dates and native place, his rank of major general, his service as commander of the 1st Armoured Division and as deputy commander and commander of the 38th Group Army, the 38th Group Army's station at Baoding and its main-force status, his refusal on 19 May 1989 of a verbal martial-law order and his demand for a written order, his 1990 conviction for disobeying orders with a five-year sentence and expulsion from the party, his death in Shijiazhuang on 8 January 2021, and the surfacing in 2025 of the trial video confirming the verbal order and the absence of a written document, supported by the English Wikipedia entry, Yang Jisheng's interview record, Wu Renhua's identification and circulation notes, Guardian and AFP reporting in 2025, the United States National Security Archive's Tiananmen materials, and Hong Kong obituary reporting. Grade B, resting on a single reliable source or a stated account: the cause of his hospitalisation is given in parallel as injury in a hand-grenade training accident, found in retellings connected with his trial statements, and kidney stones, found in Yang Jisheng's interview record; the weeping at television reports rests on Yang's account; four years in Qincheng and a fifth year in a police hospital rest on Gao Yu's account and others; the widely circulated beheading-and-sinner-of-history phrasing is a retelling whose wording is not used as a verbatim quotation, and his core courtroom formulation follows the reporting on the 2025 video. Grade C, unverified or no-public-record matters: the trial court's name varies slightly between sources; no exact month or day for the trial is publicly recorded; the exact date he was taken away and his place of detention are not completely recorded; his release year is about 1995; the forms of surveillance are not systematically recorded; and the channel and exact date of the video's surfacing are not publicly recorded. No single quotation on this page exceeds fifty words. This page is the fourth item in the third batch of this site's Resistance column, whose established order is Wang Rongfen, Li Jiulian and Zhong Haiyuan, the 1986 student movement, and Xu Qinxian; the first three are already published, and this page follows in sequence, so no question of queue-jumping arises.
Our Take
What most deserves archiving in Xu Qinxian's case is not the word courage. It is that a serving soldier used five years of his life to price a procedural question: an order to move a main-force group army into the capital against civilians was an order that, astonishingly, nobody would sign, and everybody would only pass on by word of mouth. By demanding a written order he was demanding that whoever gave it leave a name behind, and the system preferred to remove a group army commander and jail him for five years rather than supply that one signature. That tells us the men who gave the order knew themselves that it could not bear daylight. The heavier result stands beside it: the refusal did not stop the suppression, and the 38th Army entered Beijing all the same. That should remind every teller of this story that, in a system ruled by the gun, conscience can preserve one man's integrity but cannot save a city. Yet integrity is not weightless. In the six hours of video that surfaced in 2025, Xu in the dock left everything he had to say inside the record, while the men who gave the order have to this day left no document they dared to sign. On one side stands the complete trial of the man who was jailed; on the other, the complete silence of the victors. Which way history's scales tip, that video has already weighed once for those who come after. This site records Xu Qinxian to preserve that contrast: a man who refused to become a sinner of history was sentenced by history's temporary custodians to five years, while the men who made the crime would not even write their own names on the order.