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中国共产主义历史罪证与受害者记录
China: Archive of Communist Crimes & Victims
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Hua Guofeng

⚖ Persecution Responsibility

Persecution events ordered, directed, or condoned by Hua Guofeng while in office: position → decision → consequence.

PositionEvent & Responsibility
CCP Chairman (1976–1981)Purge after the Gang of Four
Directed the "two cases" trials (the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques)
CCP ChairmanThe "Two Whatevers" and thought control
Insisted on the "whatever" doctrine, delaying rehabilitations and intellectual liberation

Detailed Events

1. The "Expose, Criticize, Investigate" Campaign (Oct 1976–Dec 1978): the purge of Gang of Four associates spirals out of control

Time: Oct 1976–Dec 1978 | Place: Nationwide | Scale: Sweeping investigations; in Shanghai alone 5,385 people were listed as targets

After the Gang of Four's arrest on October 6, 1976, an October 25 editorial in the "two papers and one journal" called for thoroughly exposing the crimes of the Wang–Zhang–Jiang–Yao anti-Party clique and "eliminating their pernicious influence," launching the nationwide "Expose, Criticize, Investigate" campaign. The center advanced it in three phases: incriminating materials were released on December 10, 1976 (Part One), March 6, 1977 (Part Two) and September 23, 1977 (Part Three); in July 1977 the Third Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee expelled Wang, Zhang, Jiang and Yao from the Party. Only after the Third Plenary Session of December 1978 ended nationwide mass campaigns, and a January 9, 1979 People's Daily editorial called for the campaign to be "brought to a proper close," did it wind down. According to related research, the campaign spiraled badly out of control locally: the standard for "links to the Gang of Four" was broadened layer by layer, and large numbers of cadres and ordinary people were investigated, isolated or detained. In Shanghai, where the purge was most thorough: by the end of 1980, 5,385 people had been listed as investigation targets, and counting those handled for links to the Gang, for smash-and-grab offenses, in the "two cases" trials and for rush Party admissions, 10,747 people were punished for "three kinds of people" errors or crimes, 903 of them sentenced to prison. (Sources: CCP Central Committee documents, People's Daily editorials, academic research, Shanghai archival materials)

2. The "Two Cases" Special Tribunal Trial (Nov 20, 1980–Jan 25, 1981)

Time: Nov 20, 1980–Jan 25, 1981 | Place: Beijing | Scale: 10 principal defendants tried; 2 death sentences with reprieve, 1 life sentence, 7 fixed prison terms

A special tribunal of the Supreme People's Court publicly tried the 10 principal defendants of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques. On January 25, 1981, the verdicts were announced: Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao — death with a two-year reprieve (reduced to life imprisonment in 1983); Wang Hongwen — life imprisonment; Yao Wenyuan — 20 years; Chen Boda — 18 years; Huang Yongsheng — 18 years; Wu Faxian — 17 years; Li Zuopeng — 17 years; Qiu Huizuo — 16 years; Jiang Tengjiao — 18 years. The trial took place while Hua Guofeng was still nominally CCP Chairman (he resigned in June 1981), though the organization of the trial was actually led by Peng Zhen. It was the closing act of Hua's post–Gang of Four rectification, and the beginning of the post–Cultural Revolution practice of settling accounts with political opponents in judicial form. (Sources: Xinhua report of January 25, 1981; published verdicts of the Supreme People's Court special tribunal)

3. The "Two Whatevers" suppress intellectual liberation and delay rehabilitations (1977–1978)

Time: Feb 1977–Dec 1978 | Place: Nationwide | Scale: Thought control; slowed the rehabilitation of Cultural Revolution wrongful cases

On February 7, 1977, a joint editorial of the "two papers and one journal," "Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link," proclaimed the "Two Whatevers": resolutely uphold whatever decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave. In substance this meant "taking Mao's rights and wrongs as one's own," which blocked the rehabilitation of the Cultural Revolution's many wrongful cases and delayed the reversal of verdicts. After Guangming Daily published the special commentator's article "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth" on May 11, 1978, published Party histories record that Wang Dongxing — Hua Guofeng's close ally, head of the Central Committee's General Office — ordered Red Flag magazine not to reprint it, suppressing the debate, until Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying and others voiced support and the tide turned. The Third Plenary Session of December 1978 formally repudiated the "Two Whatevers," marking the collapse of Hua Guofeng's political line. (Sources: the February 7, 1977 joint editorial; Guangming Daily, May 11, 1978; published Party histories)

Hua Guofeng

CCP ChairmanPremier of the State CouncilSmashed the "Gang of Four"

This file is compiled from published historical materials and academic research. Hua Guofeng was the key figure who ended the Cultural Revolution, and also the last product of Mao's system of personally designated succession. On his "Two Whatevers" line and his historical merits and faults, this file presents differing views side by side and draws no conclusion.

I. Early Years and Rise in Hunan

Hua Guofeng was born on February 16, 1921, in Jiaocheng County, Shanxi; his original name was Su Zhu. In 1938 he joined the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party, taking the name "Hua Guofeng" — from "Vanguard of the Chinese Nation's Resistance to Japan and National Salvation." He worked for years in local posts in Shanxi and Hunan, known for being "honest and obedient."

After 1949 he worked continuously in Hunan: county Party secretary in Xiangyin in the 1950s, promoting agricultural collectivization; by the 1960s a secretary of the Hunan provincial Party committee and then its first secretary. During the "Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture" campaign, Hunan was an enthusiastic province. In 1970 Hua entered the central leadership as a representative of local cadres, joining the State Council's operations group.

After the Lin Biao incident of 1971 his rise continued: elected to the Politburo in 1973, vice-premier and minister of public security in 1975. Mao in his late years valued Hua's "honesty and loyalty"; after Zhou Enlai's death in January 1976, Mao nominated him acting premier, and on April 7, 1976, the Politburo made him First Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and Premier. Mao wrote in his own hand: "With you in charge, I am at ease" (per the officially published inscription). (Sources: relevant chapters of the Chronicle of Hua Guofeng; History of the Chinese Communist Party, vol. 2; Mao's inscription as released by the Central Archives)

II. Smashing the "Gang of Four": October 6, 1976

After Mao's death on September 9, 1976, the struggle for supreme power came to a head. The "Gang of Four" (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen) sought to seize power, while the side represented by Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying and Wang Dongxing decided to strike first.

On the evening of October 6, 1976, Hua, in the name of a meeting, lured the four separately to Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai, announced the Politburo's decision to place them under "isolation for investigation," and had them arrested. The operation was executed by Wang Dongxing (director of the General Office and commander of the 8341 Unit), with Ye Jianying (vice-chairman of the Military Commission) coordinating the military side. Participants recalled that the whole process was bloodless.

On October 7 the Politburo elected Hua chairman of the Central Committee and of the Central Military Commission. On October 14 the Central Committee issued its notice on the Wang–Zhang–Jiang–Yao anti-Party clique, declaring the Gang of Four an "anti-Party clique"; the Cultural Revolution was effectively over.

Assessments differ: the official and mainstream view holds that smashing the Gang of Four was "a great victory of the Party and the people" that ended ten years of turmoil; some researchers note that Hua acted both to "correct the errors of the Cultural Revolution" and to consolidate his own power; others observe that resolving a power struggle by a "palace coup" itself continued the logic of power in the Mao era. (Sources: the Central Committee's October 1976 notice on the Gang of Four incident; Ye Yonglie's documentary works on the Gang's rise and fall; recollections of participants including Wu De and Chen Xilian)

III. The "Two Whatevers" and the Truth-Criterion Debate

Once in power, Hua kept Mao's banner high. On February 7, 1977, the People's Daily, Red Flag and the PLA Daily jointly published the editorial "Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link," proposing: "We must resolutely uphold whatever decisions Chairman Mao made; we must unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave" — the "Two Whatevers."

In substance the Two Whatevers meant "taking Mao's rights and wrongs as one's own," refused to reflect on the Cultural Revolution, and drew discontent from many cadres in the Party at the time. On May 10, 1978, Theory Trends published the special commentator's article "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth"; Guangming Daily reprinted it the next day, setting off a nationwide debate. Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and others supported the "practice criterion" against the Two Whatevers.

From December 18 to 22, 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee met. It repudiated the Two Whatevers, established the ideological line of "emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts," and decided to shift the focus of work to socialist modernization. At that session Deng Xiaoping in practice replaced Hua as the supreme decision-maker, though he did not hold the Party's top post.

This file records: the "Two Whatevers" were the emblematic expression of Hua Guofeng's adherence to Mao's line; the truth-criterion debate was the ideological precursor of reform and opening. Their confrontation is the central thread of China's political turn in 1978. (Sources: the February 7, 1977 joint editorial; the Guangming Daily special commentator's article of May 11, 1978; the communiqué of the Third Plenary Session, December 22, 1978)

IV. Power Drains Away: The Fall

After the Third Plenary Session, Hua Guofeng's power drained rapidly:

After stepping down, Hua withdrew from politics, lived in seclusion, and rarely appeared in public. At 12:50 p.m. on August 20, 2008, he died of illness in Beijing at 87. The official assessment called him "a loyal communist fighter tested over a long period." (Sources: Xinhua reports of September 10, 1980 and June 29, 1981; Xinhua obituary, August 20, 2008)

V. Historical Assessment: Terminator and Transitional Figure

Assessments of Hua Guofeng show a clear "merits and faults" pattern:

This file's view: Hua's "merit" (arresting the Gang) and "fault" (the Two Whatevers) are both facts; we make no simple judgment of "merit outweighs fault" or the reverse. His identity as "Mao's designated successor" in itself reveals the deep problems of the system of that era. (Sources: the official obituary assessment of August 2008; academic research including Xiao Donglian's lectures on PRC history; relevant discussions in the 1981 Resolution)

VII. The Hunan Years: "Learn from Dazhai" and Local Governance

Hua Guofeng worked in Hunan for nearly thirty years (1949–1976, with intervals), and his local governance style shaped his later rule. In the 1960s, as a secretary and then first secretary of the Hunan provincial Party committee, he actively promoted the "Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture" campaign, demanding to "go all out and aim high."

During the Great Leap Forward, Hunan was among the hardest-hit provinces. Later disclosures put its abnormal deaths in 1959–1961 in the millions (the exact figures are disputed among scholars; this site's Great Famine file presents side-by-side estimates). As a provincial leader, Hua bears local leadership responsibility for policy implementation at the time. This period is rarely mentioned since, but it is important background for understanding his political character — "obedient" and "keeping in step."

In 1970 Hua was selected into the center as a "model local cadre." That path — direct promotion from the provinces — differed from leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping with deep Party seniority: his power came wholly from Mao's personal trust, not from Party factions or revolutionary credentials. This explains why his power base evaporated so quickly after Mao's death. (Sources: Hunan Provincial Gazetteer; the Hunan chapters of the Chronicle of Hua Guofeng; scholarly research on Hunan famine data — figures disputed, see this site's event files)

VIII. Later Years: Twenty Years of Silence (1981–2008)

The manner of Hua Guofeng's fall was almost without precedent in CCP elite politics: he was not expelled from the Party, not investigated or purged, but "resigned" step by step. After giving up the Party chairmanship and the CMC chairmanship in June 1981, he kept the vice-chairmanship until September 1982; more unusual still, he then sat as an ordinary Central Committee member through five consecutive Party congresses, leaving the Central Committee only at the 16th Congress in 2002. (Source: Chinese Wikipedia's Hua Guofeng entry, table of posts: Central Committee tenure 1969–2002) From Party chairman to ordinary committee member to full retirement, he spent twenty-one years on the "steps" down.

In those twenty-one years he almost never appeared in public, gave no interviews, wrote no memoir, and made no public comment on the events of his rule. What public reporting can find is only his presence at ceremonial occasions — Party congresses, Spring Festival gatherings — and brief reports of two trips back to his hometown in Jiaocheng, Shanxi, in the 1990s. Compared with other fallen leaders of his era — Hu Yaobang, who died in frustration after a forced resignation, and Zhao Ziyang, who spent sixteen years under house arrest until death — Hua's later years were calm. But the other side of calm was total silence: a man who had been the Party's supreme leader left, to his death, not one public word of self-defense or reflection about his five years in power, the Two Whatevers, or the inside story of the Gang of Four's arrest. His silence was self-protection — and it was also the system's standard arrangement for losers: no prosecution, and no permission to speak.

In 2001, some overseas media reported that Hua Guofeng had applied to leave the Party; neither the authorities nor Hua himself ever confirmed it, and nothing followed. (This report is unverified; this file records only that the report existed.) What can be confirmed is only this: he remained a Party member until his death, and the official obituary was issued at the rank of a Party leader.

IX. Family: Han Zhijun and the Children

Hua Guofeng's wife, Han Zhijun (born February 21, 1930, from Wutai, Shanxi), married him in January 1949; her father, Han Qihai, had been a guerrilla captain in Wutai County. Han Zhijun worked as a cadre in the Xiangtan prefectural committee in Hunan and rarely appeared in public during Hua's rule. (Source: Chinese Wikipedia, Han Zhijun entry) The couple had four children, all using the family surname Su: the eldest son, Su Hua, an air force officer, now retired; the second son, Su Bin, a graduate of the PLA National Defence University who later worked in real-estate development and investment; the elder daughter, Su Ling, who worked in the civil-aviation system and served as a member of the CPPCC National Committee; and the younger daughter, Su Li, a cadre in the National Government Offices Administration who served as Hua's life secretary. (Source: Chinese Wikipedia, Han Zhijun entry, "Children") The children's careers all proceeded smoothly within the system — a contrast with the fates of many families of losers in political struggles, and a sign that Hua's fall was handled as a "normal transition," not an "enemy problem."

X. After Death: From Babaoshan to Guashan

After Hua's death on August 20, 2008, the Xinhua obituary called him "an outstanding member of the Chinese Communist Party, a loyal communist fighter tested over a long period, and a proletarian revolutionary" — the standard formula for a deceased Party and state leader. It affirmed his achievement in smashing the Gang of Four and did not mention the Two Whatevers. On August 31, 2008, a farewell ceremony was held at Beijing's Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery, with Han Zhijun accompanied by their children; his ashes were first placed at Babaoshan. (Source: China News Service, August 31, 2008)

In November 2011, following his wish to "return to Guashan," the ashes were moved to Guashan in Jiaocheng County, Shanxi, at a site named the "Lüliang Heroes' Plaza." (Source: public reporting; details of the reburial vary slightly across reports) Guashan was where he had joined the anti-Japanese guerrillas in 1938 — the boy who went up the mountain to fight, the old man who fell from power, returning to the mountain after death. For a man lifted to the summit by one sentence from a leader and pushed down by the times, the most concrete personal wish he left behind was this one arrangement about where to be buried.

The official handling of his historical place is also observable: 2021 marked the centenary of his birth, and no large-scale official commemorative activities were reported; in Party-history narratives his space remains limited — affirm the smashing of the Gang of Four, avoid the Two Whatevers, blur the transition. The silence of his lifetime and the muting after his death are two ends of the same treatment.

XI. Why This File Includes Hua Guofeng

This site's People section distinguishes decision-makers from victims; Hua Guofeng belongs to a special category among the former. He was not the designer of a mass persecution — his five years in power were precisely the winding-down of the Cultural Revolution's trauma. But the reasons to include him are equally clear. First, the "Expose, Criticize, Investigate" campaign he presided over spiraled nationwide; in Shanghai alone more than ten thousand people were handled, and the inertia of campaign-style rectification did not stop on his watch. Second, the Two Whatevers froze rehabilitations and intellectual debate at the highest level of power, and countless victims of wrongful cases waited two more years. Third, his rise and fall passed through no accountable procedure at any point — and that is itself the soil in which persecution grows. This file sets his merits and faults side by side precisely to record that line: ending the Cultural Revolution was the merit; perpetuating its logic was the fault; the subject of both is the same man, and the soil is the same system.

本站点评Our Take

华国锋是理解这个体制的一把钥匙:他的权力来自一句"你办事,我放心",不来自任何程序;他的下台同样不来自任何程序,只来自力量对比的变化。他用宫廷方式抓捕"四人帮",终结了文革,又用"两个凡是"试图延续产生文革的逻辑本身——终结一场灾难的人,差一点成为灾难的守灵人。值得注意的是结局:他没有被清算,而是被沉默——保留虚衔二十年,至死不发一言。这不是宽容,而是体制处理失败者的成熟工艺:不给你说话的机会,你也就没有了被历史重新审理的可能。Hua Guofeng is a key to understanding the system: his power came from a single sentence — "with you in charge, I am at ease" — not from any procedure; and his fall likewise came from no procedure, only from a shift in the balance of forces. He ended the Cultural Revolution by palace arrest, then tried with the "Two Whatevers" to perpetuate the very logic that had produced it — the man who ended a catastrophe nearly became its watchman. Note the ending: he was not purged but silenced — kept in nominal posts for twenty years, never uttering a public word until death. That is not leniency; it is the system's mature craft for handling losers: deny a man the chance to speak, and history loses the chance to retry his case.

VI. Sources and Conventions

This file follows this site's About page:

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