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Che Jun (1955– )

A full-ministerial-rank cadre formed in the political-legal and organisation systems who spent five years as Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. He came to Zhejiang as governor in July 2016 and was provincial Party secretary from April 2017 to August 2020. The most violent phase of the cross-removal campaign had essentially ended before he arrived — its initiator was his predecessor Xia Baolong — but on Che's watch the campaign was never corrected; it was converted into institutionalised, day-to-day control: Gu Yuese was arrested a second time and held for nearly a year before the prosecution was withdrawn; Wenzhou's underground bishop Shao Zhumin was taken away repeatedly, once for more than seven months; more than one hundred Wenzhou churches received notices barring minors in August 2017; the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs were enforced in Zhejiang from 2018; and Linhai bookseller Chen Yu was arrested in 2019 in a case that led to more than ten thousand of his customers being summoned nationwide (his seven-year sentence was handed down after Che left office and is not counted in his tenure). Checked name by name, he appears on no US, EU, UK or Canadian sanctions list; when the Corps as an institution was designated by the US in 2020, the leaders named were the incumbents Sun Jinlong and Peng Jiarui, not him. He now chairs the Population, Resources and Environment Committee of the 14th CPPCC National Committee.

Name

Che Jun (车俊, Chē Jùn)

Born

July 1955, Chaohu, Anhui Province (official biographies give only the month and year, not the day; the specific day of birth is: no reliable public record, and this site does not invent one)

Career in brief

Sent-down youth and commune cadre in Changfeng County, Anhui (from 1973); assistant judge, judge, division head and vice-president of the Hefei Intermediate People's Court (1979–1989); deputy director and then director of the Hefei Public Security Bureau (1989–1993); deputy Party secretary of Hefei, executive vice-mayor and mayor (1993–2001); Party secretary of Hefei and member of the Anhui Provincial Party Standing Committee (2001–2005); Hebei Provincial Party Standing Committee member and head of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission (2005–2006), head of the provincial Organization Department (2006–2008), deputy Party secretary of Hebei concurrently Party secretary of Shijiazhuang (2008–2010); deputy Party secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Party secretary and Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and chairman of the China Xinjian Group Corporation (2010 – 30 April 2015; confirmed at full ministerial rank in September 2010), member of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Group, remaining deputy Party secretary of Xinjiang until June 2016 after leaving the Corps post; deputy Party secretary of Zhejiang, vice-governor and acting governor (4 July 2016), governor (elected 20 January 2017); Party secretary of Zhejiang (26 April 2017 – 31 August 2020), concurrently chairman of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress (July 2017 – September 2020); alternate member of the 17th Central Committee and full member of the 18th and 19th Central Committees

Tenure and responsibility

This site includes Che Jun not because he ordered any famous campaign — on the contrary, the most violent phase of Zhejiang's cross-removal campaign had essentially ended before he arrived, and its initiator was his predecessor Xia Baolong (see this site's Xia Baolong file). What this file records is a different kind of responsibility. A cadre formed in the political-legal and organisation systems, who spent five years as political commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, came to Zhejiang in July 2016, served first as governor and then as Party secretary, and across his four years and two months in charge the campaign he inherited was never corrected, never reckoned with, but instead continued in a quieter, more institutionalised form: the provincial church leader who had opposed the cross removals was arrested a second time on his watch and held for nearly a year; Wenzhou's underground Catholic bishop was taken away repeatedly on his watch; minors were barred en masse from church doors; the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs were put into force by his administration; and a Christian bookseller was arrested in his province in a case that triggered a nationwide police trawl of more than ten thousand book buyers. No publicly available document shows Che personally ordering any of these things, and this site does not allege that he did. What it records is the responsibility of an institutional chief — provincial Party secretary and governor: these things happened inside his jurisdiction, were carried out by systems subordinate to him, and continued throughout his tenure, and he never publicly stopped, corrected or apologised for any of them

Signature responsibility events

Five years as Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (2010–2015; the Corps as an institution was sanctioned by the United States in 2020, but Che Jun personally is not on that list — see the sanctions-check section); the second arrest of Gu Yuese — former senior pastor of Hangzhou's Chongyi Church and chairman of the Zhejiang Christian Council — whose family received the arrest notice on 7 January 2017 and who remained in custody until charges were withdrawn and he was released on 24 December 2017, the entire detention falling within Che's tenure as Zhejiang governor and then Party secretary; the repeated removals of Wenzhou's underground Catholic bishop Shao Zhumin — taken away around Holy Week in April 2017, taken again on 18 May 2017 by Zhejiang religious-affairs officials and held for more than seven months, released on 3 January 2018, and taken away again in November 2018; the August 2017 notices served on more than one hundred Wenzhou churches barring minors from entering; enforcement in Zhejiang after the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs took effect on 1 February 2018 — fourteen Wenzhou house-church leaders disappearing into police custody in January 2018, more than three hundred Christian students at two Zhejiang secondary schools made to fill in forms declaring they held no religious belief in April 2018, and teachers in Wenzhou and elsewhere required to sign no-faith pledges in September 2018; the 12 September 2019 arrest of Linhai Christian bookseller Chen Yu (online name Zhang Xiaomai), after which the Ministry of Public Security issued a nationwide notice and more than ten thousand buyers of his books were summoned for questioning (his sentencing, on 27 September 2020, fell after Che had left office, and this file divides the case at that date and does not count the sentence as occurring on Che's watch); crosses again removed from, or forcibly self-removed by, Three-Self churches in Yongjia and Longgang, Wenzhou, in July 2020 (Bitter Winter reporting, single source, marked unverified)

Sanctions

Checked name by name for this file: as of this site's check in October 2026, no listing of Che Jun was found on the lists of the United States (the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control Specially Designated Nationals list and the State Department's public designation and visa-restriction announcements), the European Union (Council sanctions lists), the United Kingdom (the UK Sanctions List) or Canada (Special Economic Measures and Magnitsky-type listings). Three easily confused facts must be kept separate. First, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps — the institution Che headed for five years — was designated by the US Treasury on 31 July 2020, but the Corps leaders designated alongside it were Sun Jinlong and Peng Jiarui, not Che Jun. Second, none of the Chinese officials designated by the United States and, in coordination, the EU, the UK and Canada over Xinjiang in 2020–2021 (Chen Quanguo, Zhu Hailun, Wang Mingshan, Huo Liujun, Wang Junzheng, Chen Mingguo and others) is Che Jun. Third, his predecessor Xia Baolong was designated by the United States on 7 August 2020, but for his Hong Kong office, not for the Zhejiang cross campaign, and that designation has nothing to do with Che Jun. The scope and method of the check are set out in the sanctions-check section of the main text

Current status

On 31 August 2020 Che left the Zhejiang Party secretaryship, with official reporting using the formula "no longer serving owing to age"; on 17 October 2020 the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress appointed him a deputy chairperson of the NPC Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee, a post he held until the 13th NPC's term ended in March 2023; on 17 January 2023 he was elected a member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and on 13 March 2023 he was elected chairman of that committee's Population, Resources and Environment Committee. As of this site's check in October 2026, there is no public record of his leaving that CPPCC committee chairmanship, and no public record of his being investigated, disciplined or prosecuted. Born in July 1955, he turned seventy-one in 2026

1. Career: from the Hefei courts and police to full ministerial rank

Che Jun was born in July 1955 in Chaohu, Anhui. In February 1973 he went to the Dongfanghong Commune in Changfeng County as a sent-down youth, and he joined the Chinese Communist Party in December of the same year. During those years he served as deputy secretary of a commune Youth League committee, Party branch secretary of a production brigade, Party secretary of Sanhe Commune and deputy Party secretary of the Yanggong district — the typical starting point of a generation of grassroots cadres at the end of the Cultural Revolution: first learn how the system works at its outermost edge of power in the countryside, then climb, step by step. In December 1979 he entered the Hefei Intermediate People's Court, working his way from assistant judge through judge, office secretary and deputy director, deputy head and head of the First Criminal Division, and member of the court's Party group, until in February 1988 he became the court's vice-president and deputy Party group secretary. Between 1981 and 1984 he studied law by correspondence at the East China University of Political Science and Law; he later also graduated from the Central Party School's correspondence programme in economic management.

In March 1989 he moved from the court to the police: deputy director and deputy Party secretary of the Hefei Public Security Bureau, and from December 1990 its director. A man who had been both a court vice-president and a police chief had handled both ends of the political-legal system — a pattern that recurs throughout his later career. In May 1993 he became deputy Party secretary of Hefei, in March 1995 concurrently executive vice-mayor, in May 1999 acting mayor, in January 2000 mayor, in March 2001 Party secretary of Hefei, in October of the same year a member of the Anhui Provincial Party Standing Committee, and in January 2003 concurrently chairman of the Standing Committee of the Hefei People's Congress. He spent sixteen years building his position in Hefei — bench, police bureau, city government, city Party committee — and it was the first territory of his career.

In March 2005 Che left Anhui for Hebei as a provincial Party Standing Committee member and head of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission — the political-legal portfolio again. In November 2006 he moved to head the provincial Organization Department, switching from policing to cadres. In May 2008 he rose to deputy Party secretary of Hebei. That same year the Sanlu milk scandal broke: the Sanlu Group, headquartered in Shijiazhuang, and other Chinese milk producers were exposed as selling infant formula adulterated with melamine, in a scandal that shook the whole country. In September 2008 Che was made Party secretary of Shijiazhuang concurrently, replacing the dismissed Wu Xianguo and taking over a provincial capital in the aftermath of a major public-safety scandal. His later transfers to Xinjiang and then to Zhejiang follow the same pattern visible on his résumé: the "firefighter" posting, in which a cadre with a political-legal background and crisis experience is sent wherever a situation has blown up or become hard to control.

Sources: Che Jun biographies and appointment reports published by Xinhua and People's Daily Online; the Wikipedia entries "Che Jun" (Chinese and English), with the timelines cross-checked item by item against official reporting; People's Daily Online, 4 July 2016, on his appointment as Zhejiang vice-governor and acting governor; The Paper, 26 April 2017, on the Central Committee decision appointing him Zhejiang Party secretary in succession to Xia Baolong.

2. Xinjiang and the Corps: five years as political commissar (2010–2015) — institutional responsibility and its limits

In May 2010 Che was transferred to Xinjiang as deputy Party secretary of the region, and at the same time made Party secretary and Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and chairman of the China Xinjian Group Corporation. In September of that year his rank was confirmed as full ministerial; he was also a member of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Group. The timing was not accidental. After the serious violence in Ürümqi in July 2009, Beijing carried out a major reshuffle of Xinjiang's entire leadership: Zhang Chunxian replaced Wang Lequan as regional Party secretary, and Che was placed into Xinjiang in the same reshuffle, with his job description written into the posts themselves — deputy Party secretary for coordination, Corps commissar for the paramilitary colonisation force.

To understand the weight of the Corps commissar post, one first has to understand what the Corps is. Founded in 1954 from demobilised soldiers, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is a special organisation that combines a military form with the functions of an economic conglomerate: it has its own divisions, regiments, farms, cities, enterprises, schools, hospitals, courts and prison system, governs a population in the millions, and holds land and industries across Xinjiang. Nominally under the dual leadership of the Xinjiang region and the centre, in practice it is a system unto itself. The Political Commissar is the Corps' supreme political chief, ranking alongside the Corps Commander as its two top leaders. Che sat in that seat for nearly five years, from May 2010 to April 2015. On 30 April 2015 Han Yong succeeded him as Corps commissar; Che stepped down from the Corps but remained deputy Party secretary of Xinjiang until his transfer out in June 2016.

This file keeps two lines in recording that period. The first line: institutional responsibility is recorded. During his years as commissar the Corps was one of the core pillars of Xinjiang's stability-maintenance system, and 2010 to 2015 was precisely the period in which, after the Ürümqi violence, stability work across Xinjiang was intensified and the Corps' stability-and-border-garrison function was expanded, including into southern Xinjiang. As the Corps' supreme political chief, as a regional deputy Party secretary, and as a member of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Group, Che bears the institutional chief's responsibility for the stability work in which the Corps system participated in those years, and that responsibility does not lapse with time. The second line: the limits of attribution are kept just as firmly. Xinjiang's mass internment camp system was built and operated from 2017 onward, after Chen Quanguo took over as regional Party secretary in August 2016 — by which time Che had been out of Xinjiang for more than a year. This site has found no public material connecting the establishment or operation of the camps to Che Jun personally, and it therefore does not place the camps against his name. What happened on whose watch is recorded under that person's name: the rule is applied identically to every file in this section. Likewise, when the Corps as an institution was designated by the US Treasury on 31 July 2020, its Party secretaryship and commissarship had long changed hands, and the Corps leaders designated with it were the incumbents Sun Jinlong and Peng Jiarui (see this site's Peng Jiarui file); Che Jun is not on that list. That an institution was later sanctioned does not mean he personally was sanctioned; and his five years at the institution do not, merely because the institution was later sanctioned, automatically become a personal offence. This file writes the three layers separately because mixing them together would be unfair to anyone and would not survive checking.

Sources: Wikipedia entries "Che Jun" and "Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps"; China Economic Net, 30 April 2015, on Han Yong succeeding Che Jun as Corps political commissar; US Treasury OFAC announcement of 31 July 2020 designating the XPCC and Sun Jinlong and Peng Jiarui.

3. Zhejiang overview: what kind of province did he take over?

In June 2016 Che was transferred to Zhejiang as deputy Party secretary of the province. On 4 July 2016 the Standing Committee of the 12th Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress accepted Li Qiang's resignation as governor and appointed Che vice-governor and acting governor. On 20 January 2017 the fifth session of the 12th Provincial People's Congress elected him governor. On 26 April 2017 the Central Committee decided: Che Jun would be Party secretary of Zhejiang, and Xia Baolong would no longer serve. On 7 July 2017 he was elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Congress. With the top posts of Party, government and people's congress in one pair of hands, he became Zhejiang's undisputed first-in-command, and he remained so until he handed the Party secretaryship to Yuan Jiajun on 31 August 2020. His Zhejiang tenure divides into a governorship from July 2016 to April 2017 and a Party secretaryship from April 2017 to August 2020 — four years and two months in all.

The Zhejiang he took over occupied a very particular place on the religious question. From late 2013, the "Three Rectifications and One Demolition" campaign led by then Party secretary Xia Baolong had targeted the crosses on church roofs across the province: Wenzhou's Sanjiang Church was levelled in its entirety on 28 April 2014; Pingyang pastor Huang Yizi was sentenced to prison in 2015; Beijing lawyer Zhang Kai, who defended the churches, was secretly detained in August 2015 and held incommunicado for nearly seven months; Jinhua Holy Love Church pastors Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang were sentenced to fourteen and twelve years respectively in February 2016; and Hangzhou Chongyi Church senior pastor Gu Yuese was removed from his post and secretly detained in January 2016. The number of crosses torn down across the province is put by the various counts at between roughly 1,200 and 1,700 (for the counting conventions, see this site's Xia Baolong file). The full record of that campaign is in this site's Xia Baolong file and the related persecution files, and this page does not repeat it. What matters here is its relation to Che Jun: on the scholarly spatio-temporal analysis of the campaign (Fenggang Yang and others, published in the Review of Religion and Chinese Society), the forced cross-removal campaign had already essentially stopped by April 2016 — which is to say that when Che arrived in Zhejiang in July 2016, the campaign's most violent phase was over. He was neither its initiator nor its principal executor.

But "the campaign stopped" did not mean "the matter ended". Nothing the campaign had produced was touched: the sentenced pastors were still in prison; the removed church leader was still suspended inside an open case; not one demolished cross received any restorative word; and the campaign's working method — disposing of churches in the name of "illegal construction" — was never publicly repudiated. More importantly, religious control at the national level was changing gear: the National Conference on Religious Work in April 2016 set the direction of the "sinicisation" of religion; in September 2017 the State Council promulgated the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs, which took effect on 1 February 2018. Zhejiang — the province where the cross campaign began and served as its testing ground — was, on Che's watch, to complete the conversion of campaign-style suppression into institutionalised control: how the Regulations would be enforced, how churches would be managed, and where the boundaries of activity for clergy and believers would be drawn. It was much quieter work. There were no photographs of bulldozers and no international headlines. But it decided the everyday boundaries within which the province's more than two million Christians (the figure used in the Zhejiang Christian Council's open letter of 2015) would live for years afterwards. This file's record of Che Jun's Zhejiang tenure starts from that conversion: his tenure contains no signature demolition on the Sanjiang scale, but it contains a sequence of dated, named cases and measures, every one of them falling inside his term of office.

Sources: People's Daily Online, 4 July 2016; The Paper, 20 January and 26 April 2017, appointment reporting; Fenggang Yang and others, spatio-temporal analysis of the Zhejiang cross-demolition campaign, Review of Religion and Chinese Society, 2018; Lin, case study of the Sanjiang Church, Religions (MDPI), 2018; this site's Xia Baolong file and the sources cited there.

4. The in-tenure religious record (I): the second half of the Gu Yuese case — a second arrest and nearly a year in custody

The first half of the Gu Yuese case belongs to Xia Baolong's tenure and is recorded in this site's Xia Baolong file: Gu Yuese, chairman of the Zhejiang Christian Council and senior pastor of Hangzhou's Chongyi Church — a congregation of some 5,500 seats and one of the largest official churches in China — had publicly written against the forced removal of crosses; on 18 January 2016 the provincial Two Organisations removed him as Chongyi's senior pastor; around 28 January he was placed under residential surveillance at a designated location on suspicion of misappropriating ten million yuan of funds; and on 31 March 2016 he was released home on bail. All of that happened before Che Jun reached Zhejiang.

The second half falls entirely within Che's tenure, on the following timeline. Shortly before Christmas 2016, Gu was taken away by police again — Che was by then governor of Zhejiang. At 5 p.m. on 7 January 2017, the Hangzhou Public Security Bureau, with the approval of the Jianggan District People's Procuratorate, formally arrested Gu Yuese on suspicion of misappropriation of funds and held him at the Hangzhou Municipal Detention Centre; his family received the arrest notice the same day. China Aid pointed out that this was a second arrest on the same charge in the same case; Gu was widely described as "the highest-ranking Christian leader arrested since the Cultural Revolution". When Reuters reported the arrest in January 2017, the Zhejiang Christian Council's response to enquiries was that it was "unaware" of the situation. For nearly a year after that, Gu remained in custody. There was no trial and no verdict. Only on 24 December 2017 — Christmas Eve — did word circulate in church circles, subsequently confirmed by several outlets: Gu Yuese had been released and sent home, and the procuratorate had withdrawn the prosecution. The outcome was never officially announced; he never returned to the Chongyi pulpit, the senior pastor's post passing to another man; and according to later reporting he moved to Spain in 2023 (a point carried in the Wikipedia entry on Gu Yuese from cited reporting, and flagged here as single-source).

Lay that timeline over Che's tenure table: when Gu was taken away the second time, Che was governor; two and a half months after the formal arrest, Che rose to Party secretary; the greater part of Gu's year in custody coincided with Che's simultaneous hold on the provincial Party committee and the provincial people's congress; and the Christmas Eve withdrawal and release also happened on his watch. This site has found no public record of Che personally intervening in the case in either direction — no evidence that he ordered the arrest, and no evidence that he ordered the release. What it records is the institutional fact: a case against a provincial official-church leader, removed from his post for publicly opposing a provincial campaign, was reactivated with a fresh arrest under the new provincial Party secretary, held a man for nearly a year, and then closed by withdrawal of the prosecution — without any Zhejiang authority at any level ever publicly explaining why a case that ended in withdrawal first required nearly a year of custody. A provincial Party secretary whose everyday vocabulary was "governing the province according to law" maintained complete silence on the most internationally watched religious case of his own tenure. That silence is itself part of what this file exists to record.

Sources: Christian Post, 12 January 2017, and China Aid, January 2017 (arrest-notice details: 7 January 2017, 17:00, Hangzhou Municipal Detention Centre); Reuters, January 2017, on the second arrest; Christian Times / China Christian Daily on the withdrawal of charges and the release; the 2016 portion as cited in this site's Xia Baolong file.

5. The in-tenure religious record (II): Bishop Shao Zhumin — the position of Wenzhou's underground Catholic Church on his watch

If the Gu case represents the official Protestant church, the position of Wenzhou's underground Catholic Church can be read from Shao Zhumin. Shao is bishop of Wenzhou diocese, recognised by the Vatican but refusing to join the official Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. In September 2016, on the death of Bishop Vincent Zhu Weifang, he succeeded as bishop of Wenzhou under the Vatican's arrangements — a succession the Chinese government does not recognise. The timetable of his repeated removals thereafter overlaps heavily with Che Jun's Zhejiang tenure.

In April 2017, around Holy Week and Easter — his first as head of the diocese — Shao was taken away by the authorities, reportedly to prevent him from celebrating the Holy Week liturgies. Che was still governor at that point and did not become Party secretary until 26 April; this file marks that segment's office status by date, exactly as it is. On 18 May 2017 officials of the Wenzhou Municipal Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs summoned and took him away, and after that his whereabouts were unknown: the diocese and his family knew neither the reason nor the place of detention. On 16 June a Catholic happened to see him at Wenzhou airport being transferred under police escort. In September he was seen, still in detention, at a hospital in Beijing, where he underwent surgery for a congenital ear condition. On 26 June the Holy See Press Office took the rare step of issuing a statement expressing "grave concern" at Bishop Shao's situation, hoping he might return to his diocese as soon as possible and calmly exercise his episcopal ministry, and noting that the diocesan community and his relatives had had no news of the reasons for his removal or of where he was held. That detention lasted more than seven months. On 3 January 2018 Shao was released. According to UCAN, before his release he was pressed to sign a document supporting the religious-affairs authorities and the self-election and self-ordination of bishops; he signed, but added a note on the document stating that he did not agree with its contents. One source's judgement was quoted across Catholic media: "What the government is doing is like the Cultural Revolution — arresting you and then forcing you to sign documents supporting the authority." In November 2018 he was taken away yet again, with Asia News reporting him in a state of "isolation and indoctrination" while pressure continued for him to join the Patriotic Association — his fifth removal in the two years since he became bishop.

The executors in this case are named clearly in the reporting: the Wenzhou municipal religious-affairs bureau, the Zhejiang provincial religious-affairs apparatus, and the public security organs. This is the daily work of the provincial and municipal religious and political-legal systems under Che Jun. No material shows him personally giving the order; no material shows him enquiring into it either, let alone stopping it. The bishop of a diocese was taken away five times in two years by government departments of the same province, one detention lasting more than seven months and drawing a public statement from the Holy See — and on the responsibility ledger of a provincial Party secretary, that is not something that can be written off as "done by the people below". This file lists the Shao Zhumin case as an in-tenure record for exactly that reason: the executing agencies were inside his jurisdiction, the dates were inside his term, the international reaction reached the level of a Holy See statement, and the province's highest official never made a single public remark about it.

Sources: UCAN, January 2018 (carried by the National Catholic Reporter, 10 January 2018, and CatholicPhilly: taken away 18 May 2017, released 3 January 2018, signed while noting disagreement); Holy See Press Office statement, 26 June 2017; Catholic World Report, 16 November 2018, on the fifth removal; the compilation on persecuted bishops citing Asia News in materials of the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC).

6. The in-tenure religious record (III): the ban on minors — from the church door to the classroom

The measure of Che's tenure that touched the daily lives of Zhejiang's Christians most widely was not an arrest. It was the driving away of children. In August 2017, more than one hundred churches in Wenzhou received government notices: minors were strictly prohibited from entering churches, and would be turned away at the door even when accompanied by their parents; organising religious activities for minors was prohibited; and a notice from Ouhai District put the reason in writing — minors receiving religious education and formation in church too early "would seriously affect the normal implementation of the education system". The notices also warned that inspection teams would conduct open and undercover checks on Sundays at both official churches and underground meeting points. Wenzhou's measures did not stop at the church door: local secondary- and primary-school teachers, hospital staff and civil servants were also barred from entering churches, according to subsequent China Aid reporting. That August, Che had been Party secretary for a little over three months.

By 2018 the line had advanced from the church door into the classroom. In April 2018 World Watch Monitor reported that more than three hundred Christian students at two secondary schools in Zhejiang had been made by their teachers to fill in forms declaring that they adhered to no religion; students who did not comply reportedly faced effects on their opportunities at school and the threat of being denied graduation certificates, without which they could not proceed to university. In May 2018 China Aid reported that education authorities in Wenzhou had required students to declare their families' religious beliefs, and that after identifying students whose parents were Catholic or of another Christian denomination, the authorities visited the parents at home to persuade them to give up their faith, in some cases working through the parents' employers, including by withholding bonuses. In mid-September 2018 Radio Free Asia reported that high-school teachers in Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Henan were being required to sign pledges of holding no religious belief. The China chapter of the US State Department's 2018 International Religious Freedom Report records both the Zhejiang teachers' no-faith pledges and the episode of the three-hundred-plus students made to fill in the forms.

The character of such measures needs to be stated plainly: they are not aimed at any specific "illegal act"; they are aimed at the intergenerational transmission of faith itself. Tearing down a cross removes the top of a building; banning minors removes the church's future — a religious community that cannot teach its faith to the next generation is one that, in the controllers' eyes, can be left to die out naturally within a generation. The practice was later folded into the enforcement reading of the new Regulations on Religious Affairs that took effect in 2018 and appeared in many places across the country; Zhejiang and Wenzhou were among the places where it took shape earliest, and the date was the first year of Che Jun's Party secretaryship. This site has found no evidence that the ban originated in a personal instruction from Che. Equally, it has found no instance in his tenure of any correction of a practice that so visibly overruns the freedom of religious belief clause of the Chinese constitution (Article 36). The ban was issued in the names of municipal and county education and religious departments under his administration and spread on his watch from one city into the school system. That is the factual part of institutional responsibility.

Sources: China Aid, August 2017 and May 2018; World Watch Monitor, September 2017 and April 2018; UCAN reporting on the Wenzhou notices; US Department of State, 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: China (Zhejiang teachers' no-faith pledges; students made to complete forms declaring no religion), archived via ecoi.net; Catholic News Agency's retrospective on Wenzhou's 2017 ban on children at religious services and its 2018 extension to teachers, hospital workers and other public employees.

7. The in-tenure religious record (IV): after the 2018 Regulations took effect — disappearances, silencing, and control made routine

In September 2017 the State Council promulgated the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs, which took effect on 1 February 2018. The new Regulations greatly expanded registration, financial, activity-approval and penalty provisions covering religious bodies, religious schools, religious activity sites and religious personnel, and they became the legal shell for the nationwide tightening of religious control that followed. The Regulations were issued by the State Council, not by Che Jun. But how they were enforced in each province — with what intensity, and against whom first — was a matter for each provincial Party committee and government. Zhejiang's enforcement face on his watch can be seen in the following dated records.

On 31 January 2018 — the day before the new Regulations took effect — China Aid reported that fourteen house-church leaders in Wenzhou had "vanished" into police custody at an undisclosed location. The fourteen belonged to a house-church network engaged in cross-cultural mission work; their names were not published. China Aid president Bob Fu's statement called it a "massive enforced disappearance". This report currently rests on China Aid as its single source — the Christian Post's report of 1 February 2018 relays China Aid — and this file marks the case single-source pending corroboration under its citation rules, while recording it because its time, place and numbers are specific. On 23 April 2018 China Aid reported that Wenzhou pastor Zhang Chongzhu had been barred from preaching and teaching by the authorities on pretextual orders — Zhang was one of the pastors arrested during the cross-removal campaign and not released until 9 May 2016, and restrictions on him were still continuing nearly two years after his release. On 6 October 2018 China Aid reported that Wenzhou pastor Yan Xiaojie had been confronted at his door by state security agents for his support of Christians in Henan, who were then under severe suppression. And according to Radio Free Asia, in August 2017 hospitals in Zhejiang began enforcing new rules prohibiting religious activities inside hospitals: patients might not pray or preach in the wards, pastors might not enter to pray for patients, and the prohibition was shown to patients on admission — religious control reaching from church and school into the hospital ward.

One further class of figures must be handled with care. The Church of Almighty God — an organisation officially designated a cult — states in its own 2018 annual report that in that year 878 of its members were arrested in Zhejiang Province, 729 detained and 31 sentenced. That is the organisation's own one-sided statistic, with no independent corroboration, and this file marks it "unverified" under its rules: it records only the fact that the organisation makes this claim, and does not adopt the figures as established. It is cited because it shows, at minimum, that in the claimant organisation's own account Zhejiang ranked among the leading provinces for arrests of its members; whether the numbers themselves are accurate is something no public record allows this site to verify. It should likewise be noted that when China Aid published its 2019 annual report it described Zhejiang as "the most aggressive" province in suppressing Christianity and as the starting point of the cross-demolition campaign — that is that organisation's comparative judgement across provinces, relayed here with its attribution, and not written up as a conclusion independently verified by this site.

Set this section's records in a row and the true shape of religious control in Che's Zhejiang becomes visible: no mass-demolition spectacles, but regulations, notices, forms, pledges, disappearances and individual interviews. The campaign had become daily administration. That is precisely why this tenure needs a file: an archive that only records the years with bulldozers would miss the years in which control was institutionalised — and institutionalised control is the harder kind to reverse.

Sources: China Aid, 31 January 2018 (fourteen Wenzhou house-church leaders, single source), 23 April 2018 (Zhang Chongzhu), 6 October 2018 (Yan Xiaojie), and its Zhejiang archive pages; Christian Post, 1 February 2018 (relay); Radio Free Asia on the Zhejiang hospital ban on religious activities (August 2017, carried by China Aid); Church of Almighty God 2018 annual report (the organisation's own Zhejiang arrest figures, single source, unverified); Catholic News Agency, 2020, on China Aid's 2019 annual report.

8. The in-tenure religious record (V): the "Wheat Bookstore" case of Chen Yu — arrest and nationwide trawl on his watch, sentence after he left

Chen Yu, online name Zhang Xiaomai, is a Christian from Linhai, Zhejiang, who ran an online bookshop called the Wheat Bookstore, selling Christian books — mostly regular Christian titles published and translated by bodies such as Wheat Publishing in the United States, among them works by Wang Yi, pastor of Chengdu's Early Rain Covenant Church. On 12 September 2019 Chen Yu was arrested by Linhai police on suspicion of selling "illegal overseas religious publications" online. What followed was out of all proportion to a bookshop: according to China Aid and multiple outlets, the Ministry of Public Security circulated the case nationwide, and public security officers across the country, working from sales records, simultaneously summoned for questioning more than ten thousand Christians who had bought books from the Wheat Bookstore. They were interrogated about the details of their purchases, required to hand over the books they had bought — with Wang Yi's The Gospel Coup named in particular — and had statements taken covering their personal histories, families, work and state of belief; some reporting describes officers in places entering buyers' homes directly and taking books from their shelves. Chen Yu was held at the Linhai Municipal Detention Centre. His mother, Zheng Jinmei, later issued a prayer letter on his behalf; during his imprisonment she fell ill with cancer and underwent repeated surgery. At her son's request she had sent him a Bible, which the detention centre at first did not pass on, so she copied out the Psalms and Romans by hand and sent those in.

This file cuts the attribution of this case at the strictest point the dates allow. Chen Yu was arrested in September 2019, and the nationwide trawl of his buyers took place in the autumn and winter of 2019. At that time Che Jun was Party secretary of Zhejiang; Linhai belongs to Taizhou in Zhejiang; and the provincial responsibility for the arrest and the trawl falls inside his tenure — this file records that as it stands. But the first-instance judgment in the case was not delivered by the Linhai Municipal People's Court until 27 September 2020: seven years' imprisonment for illegal business operations, a fine of 200,000 yuan, and the destruction of the 12,864 seized books. By then Che had left the Party secretaryship on 31 August 2020, and Zhejiang's Party secretary was Yuan Jiajun. This file's formulation is therefore: the arrest and the dragnet-style nationwide investigation occurred on Che Jun's watch; the conviction and sentence occurred twenty-seven days after he left office, and are not counted as a judgment of his tenure. The later course of the case — the appeal dismissed and the original sentence upheld by the Taizhou Intermediate People's Court on 7 January 2022 (with the result, according to reporting, first released through a WeChat public account while his lawyers had not yet been notified), and Chen Yu's release on parole on 4 April 2024, two years and five months early, from Jinhua Prison — has nothing to do with Che at all, and is recorded here only to complete the case. Cutting the timeline to this precision is not about exculpating anyone. Quite the opposite: when a bookseller is arrested for selling books and more than ten thousand of his readers are summoned one by one by the police to give statements, that does not need to wait for a judgment document before it constitutes a record of persecution. The arrest itself, and the trawl itself, are the facts that fall inside this tenure.

Sources: China Aid, Top Ten Cases of Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China in 2020 (published 25 January 2021, including the key points of the Linhai Municipal People's Court judgment), and its report of 17 April 2024 on Chen Yu's parole; the Freedom of Religion chapter of the CECC 2021 Annual Report, citing Rights Defense Network reporting of 2 October 2020 and Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00247; International Christian Concern, February 2022.

9. The in-tenure religious record (VI): the crosses of July 2020 — the campaign returns in another form

In July 2020, in the last summer of Che Jun's tenure, cross removals were again recorded in Wenzhou. According to Bitter Winter magazine: on 7 July 2020 the crosses of two Three-Self churches in Yongjia County, Wenzhou, were toppled; and on 28 July the Huai'en Church in Longgang, Wenzhou — a registered Three-Self congregation — removed the cross from its own roof after prolonged pressure. Huai'en's cross had been forcibly removed once before, in 2014, surrounded by hundreds of armed police; three years later the congregation had re-erected it; now it was coming down a second time. Congregation members told Bitter Winter that after Longgang was upgraded from a county-level town to a county-level city in September 2019, the city government had repeatedly pressed the church to remove the cross itself, because central and provincial officials were due to visit for the first anniversary of the upgrade; officials said openly that the government did not want to demolish the cross itself, because of the intense pressure from abroad and the fear that news of forced removals would be reported overseas, and so used various pretexts to pressure those in charge of places of worship to topple the symbols themselves, threatening to shut the church if they disobeyed.

This file attaches two limits to this record. First, its source: Bitter Winter's report rests on its correspondent's interviews with local believers, and there is currently no second independent source corroborating the removal of the same crosses on the same dates; under this site's citation rules it is marked single-source "unverified", and it is recorded here with its attribution and qualifiers intact. Second, even on the report's own account, the method of this round differed from 2014: no armed-police cordons, no bulldozers, but nearly a year of administrative pressure plus the coercion of "remove it yourselves". That change itself deserves to be recorded against Che's name — not because it was more merciful, but because it shows that by 2020 Zhejiang's religious control had learned to achieve the same end by cheaper, less visible means: the cross still had to come down, it just must not make international news. Che left office on 31 August 2020; these two July removals are the last checkable records of his tenure.

Sources: Bitter Winter, Zhao Mingzhe (pseudonym), "Christians Coerced into Removing Crosses from Churches" (2020 reporting, single source, unverified); the establishment of Longgang as a city (inaugurated 25 September 2019) per public reporting.

10. Other in-tenure suppression records: the institutional responsibility of stability maintenance, and an honest statement of where no case was found

The results of this site's search for other categories of suppression record in Che's tenure must be given in two parts: one part for which records exist, and one part for which none were found — and the part for which none were found is written as exactly that, without borrowing the national picture and pinning it on him personally.

The category for which an institutional record can be checked is the stability maintenance around the 19th Party Congress. The Congress sat in Beijing from 18 to 24 October 2017, and before it the whole country entered the customary stability cycle: under the territorial-responsibility rules written into the Party's stability system, each provincial Party committee bears overall responsibility for "stability" in its province, and the provincial Party secretary is the first person responsible for stability work in that province. Che took office in April 2017 and completed the territorial stability work for the Congress inside his own tenure. US Representative Chris Smith, releasing the CECC's 2018 annual report, put the responsibility chain more bluntly: Xi Jinping had personally launched the sinicisation of religion, and the centre had issued orders to every provincial Party secretary making them responsible for bringing religion into line with Party ideology. That is a US legislator's public description of the chain, relayed here with its attribution. But when it comes to named Zhejiang stability cases from the autumn of 2017 — which Zhejiang petitioner was intercepted, which Zhejiang dissident was controlled before the Congress — this site's search found no public record with a name, a date and cross-verification. Its conclusion is therefore: the territorial institutional responsibility for 19th Congress stability work attaches, under the system, to Che Jun as the then provincial Party secretary; as to specific individual cases, there is no public record, and this site fabricates none and imports none from national round-ups. As for Zhejiang dissidents, the sentencings of Hangzhou's Lü Gengsong and Chen Shuqing both predate Che's arrival (Lü Gengsong was sentenced to eleven years in June 2016, when Che had not yet reached Zhejiang); they served their sentences during his tenure, but their cases do not belong to his term, and this file does not list them as in-tenure cases — the point is made here in passing so that readers do not mistake the omission for a gap in the search.

A second boundary that needs stating concerns the Jinhua pastors Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang. The two were sentenced on 25 February 2016, by the Wucheng District People's Court in Jinhua, to fourteen and twelve years respectively — a judgment of Xia Baolong's tenure, before Che arrived (see this site's Xia Baolong file). But their sentences were served during Che's tenure: Bao Guohua in Qiaosi Prison, Xing Wenxiang in the Zhejiang Provincial Women's Prison. The couple were later, according to information disclosed by the Dui Hua Foundation in 2024, possibly granted sentence reductions, and Xing Wenxiang was released in 2025 after serving nine years, according to China Aid reporting in 2026. This site's position is: the judgment is not Che's; but the factual state of affairs — a province whose prisons held a pastor couple heavily sentenced for resisting the cross removals, whose terms spanned the whole of the new secretary's tenure, with no public review, correction or pardon initiative in that time — belongs to the Zhejiang of his tenure, and this file records the state of affairs without reassigning the judgment.

In addition, routine arrests and sentencings of members of organisations designated as cults — Falun Gong, the Church of Almighty God and others — continued in Zhejiang during Che's tenure (for the Church of Almighty God's self-reported 2018 Zhejiang figures, see section 7, marked unverified). On the Falun Gong side, this site's search found no named, cross-verifiable Zhejiang case falling inside his tenure, so it lists no individual case and records the search result itself.

Sources: CIVICUS Monitor overview of the nationwide crackdown ahead of the 19th Congress (2017); remarks by Representative Chris Smith on the release of the CECC 2018 Annual Report; Dui Hua Foundation, Prisoner Updates 2024 #7, on possible sentence reductions for Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang; Radio Free Asia, 25 February 2016, on their sentencing; China Aid, May 2026, on Xing Wenxiang's release.

11. Attribution discipline: what must not be laid at his door

The rule of this site's People section is that decision-makers and responsible officials are charged by tenure: a matter outside the tenure, however famous, must not be entered against a man's name to bulk out a file. The same ruler is applied to Che Jun, and this file lists the exclusions explicitly, for checking. First, the Zhejiang cross-removal campaign itself — late 2013 to spring 2016: its initiator and director was Xia Baolong; the levelling of Sanjiang Church (28 April 2014), the sentencing of Huang Yizi (March 2015), the secret detention of Zhang Kai (August 2015 to March 2016), the sentencing of Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang (25 February 2016) and Gu Yuese's first detention (January to March 2016) all occurred before Che arrived in July 2016, belong to the Xia Baolong file, and are mentioned here only as background. Second, the Xinjiang internment camps — built from 2017, belonging to Chen Quanguo's tenure; Che had left Xinjiang in June 2016. Third, Chen Yu's seven-year sentence — 27 September 2020, after Che had left office, belonging to Yuan Jiajun's tenure; this file records only the arrest and the trawl. Fourth, the US designation of the Corps — 31 July 2020, whose objects were the institution and its then-incumbent leaders, not a former commissar five years gone. This file sets these four exclusions out in the open because every item it does lay against Che — Gu Yuese's second arrest, Shao Zhumin's repeated removals, the ban on minors, the routinisation of enforcement under the Regulations, Chen Yu's arrest and the nationwide trawl, the July 2020 crosses — can withstand being measured with the same ruler in reverse: the dates fall inside the tenure, and the executing agencies were inside his jurisdiction. The tighter attribution is drawn, the steadier the charge stands.

12. Sanctions check: checked one by one — no listing found

In October 2026 this site carried out an item-by-item sanctions check on Che Jun, with the following scope and results. United States: the designation announcements through which the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed Chinese officials on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List — including the four Xinjiang officials and the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau on 9 July 2020, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps with Sun Jinlong and Peng Jiarui on 31 July 2020, the eleven Hong Kong officials on 7 August 2020, and Wang Junzheng and Chen Mingguo on 22 March 2021 — contain no Che Jun; the State Department's public naming lists under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Executive Order 13936 and successive visa-restriction announcements contain no Che Jun; and a search of the OpenSanctions aggregated database under his English name returns no sanctions entry matching his identity. European Union: the Council's listing of 22 March 2021 on Xinjiang (Zhu Hailun, Wang Mingshan, Wang Junzheng, Chen Mingguo and the XPCC Public Security Bureau) and successive China-related EU lists contain no Che Jun. United Kingdom: the Xinjiang batch of 22 March 2021 and the Hong Kong-related batches on the UK Sanctions List contain no Che Jun. Canada: Canada's listings of March 2021 on Xinjiang under the Special Economic Measures Act contain no Che Jun. Conclusion: within the scope checked, and as of the date of checking, no listing of Che Jun on any country's or bloc's sanctions list was found. The site also states the limits of that conclusion: lists are added to over time, and the conclusion is warranted only for the stated scope and the October 2026 checking date; and "not sanctioned" states only a list status, not a judgement on anyone's conduct in office — the composition of sanctions lists has always included diplomatic and intelligence considerations, and operates on a different standard from an archive's attribution of responsibility.

Why is a man who spent five years as Corps commissar and four years as first-in-command of Zhejiang on no list at all? This file offers only a timeline-level factual explanation and does not speculate: the various countries' Xinjiang designations concentrated on Xinjiang's incumbent leadership after the camps were built in 2017, and Che had left Xinjiang in June 2016 and the Corps commissarship in April 2015, so he fell outside the "incumbent responsible official" frame those designations used; the Hong Kong designations concerned Hong Kong-office officials and have nothing to do with him; and religious persecution in Zhejiang has never been the theme of any round of designations — even Xia Baolong, who directed the cross campaign, was designated for his later Hong Kong office and not for the Zhejiang record. That timeline itself records something worth noting: in current sanctions practice, what an official does to religious communities during a provincial tenure almost never, by itself, becomes a reason for listing him.

Sources: US Treasury OFAC designation announcements of 9 July 2020, 31 July 2020, 7 August 2020 and 22 March 2021; Council of the European Union decision of 22 March 2021; UK Sanctions List (FCDO); Global Affairs Canada announcement of March 2021; OpenSanctions database search (October 2026).

13. Current status: chairman of a CPPCC committee — a quiet ending

On 31 August 2020 the Zhejiang provincial Party committee convened a meeting of leading cadres and announced that Yuan Jiajun would be Party secretary of Zhejiang and that Che Jun would no longer serve "owing to age" — he was sixty-five, exactly on the line at which full provincial-rank officials ordinarily step back to second-line posts. The farewell line of his that official media widely quoted ran: fortunate in this life to have come to Zhejiang, no regrets in this life for Zhejiang's sake, Zhejiang in his thoughts for the rest of this life. On 17 October 2020 the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress, at its twenty-second session, appointed him a deputy chairperson of the NPC Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee — a special-committee post of the kind held by full-rank officials who have stepped back — and he held it until the 13th NPC's term ended in March 2023. On 17 January 2023 he was elected a member of the 14th CPPCC National Committee; on 13 March 2023 he was elected chairman of that committee's Population, Resources and Environment Committee.

As of this site's check in October 2026, his public identity remains chairman of the Population, Resources and Environment Committee of the 14th CPPCC National Committee, and there is no public record of his leaving that post, of any change in his retirement status, or of his being investigated, disciplined or prosecuted. Set beside the officials of his generation who went out from Zhejiang, the ending is flat and complete: no fall from power, no sanctions, no international list — only the tenure file of a provincial first-in-command, left for records like this site's to check line by line. That is exactly why this page exists: the periods in which persecution became routine often have no dramatic perpetrator, only responsible officials who rotate out on schedule; and if the archive only chases dramatic figures, whole tenures of that kind are left blank.

Sources: Xinhua, 1 September 2020, on the Zhejiang leading-cadres meeting; the appointment list of the 22nd session of the Standing Committee of the 13th NPC (17 October 2020); the membership lists of the special committees of the 14th CPPCC National Committee (13 March 2023); the current-office field of the Wikipedia entry "Che Jun", checked against the official lists.

14. Timeline

July 1955: born in Chaohu, Anhui. February 1973: begins work as a sent-down youth at the Dongfanghong Commune, Changfeng County; joins the CCP in December of the same year. December 1979: enters the Hefei Intermediate People's Court. February 1988: vice-president of the Hefei Intermediate People's Court. March 1989: deputy director of the Hefei Public Security Bureau; director from December 1990. May 1993: deputy Party secretary of Hefei. May 1999: acting mayor; elected mayor January 2000. March 2001: Party secretary of Hefei; Anhui Provincial Party Standing Committee member from October of the same year. March 2005: Hebei Provincial Party Standing Committee member and head of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission. November 2006: head of the Hebei Provincial Organization Department. May 2008: deputy Party secretary of Hebei; in September of the same year, after the Sanlu milk scandal broke, concurrently Party secretary of Shijiazhuang. May 2010: deputy Party secretary of Xinjiang, Party secretary and Political Commissar of the XPCC, chairman of the China Xinjian Group; confirmed at full ministerial rank in September of the same year. 30 April 2015: leaves the Corps commissarship, succeeded by Han Yong; remains deputy Party secretary of Xinjiang. June 2016: transferred to Zhejiang as deputy provincial Party secretary; on 4 July, vice-governor and acting governor of Zhejiang. 20 January 2017: elected governor of Zhejiang. 7 January 2017 (during his governorship): Gu Yuese formally arrested and held at the Hangzhou Municipal Detention Centre. April 2017: Bishop Shao Zhumin taken away around Holy Week. 26 April 2017: becomes Party secretary of Zhejiang. 18 May 2017: Shao Zhumin taken away by the Wenzhou municipal religious-affairs bureau and held for more than seven months; on 26 June the Holy See issues its statement of "grave concern". August 2017: more than one hundred Wenzhou churches receive notices barring minors; in the same month the prohibition of religious activities in Zhejiang hospitals is reported. September 2017: the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs are promulgated. 24 December 2017: Gu Yuese released, the prosecution withdrawn. 3 January 2018: Shao Zhumin released. 31 January 2018: the reported disappearance of fourteen Wenzhou house-church leaders into police custody is published (single source). 1 February 2018: the new Regulations on Religious Affairs take effect. April 2018: more than three hundred Christian students at two Zhejiang secondary schools are made to fill in forms declaring no religious belief; in the same month Wenzhou pastor Zhang Chongzhu is barred from preaching. September 2018: teachers in Zhejiang and elsewhere are required to sign no-faith pledges. October 2018: Wenzhou pastor Yan Xiaojie is confronted by state security agents for supporting Henan Christians. November 2018: Shao Zhumin is taken away for the fifth time. 12 September 2019: Linhai Christian bookseller Chen Yu is arrested; the Ministry of Public Security then circulates the case nationwide and more than ten thousand buyers are summoned for questioning. July 2020: crosses in Yongjia and Longgang, Wenzhou, are removed again or forcibly self-removed (single source, unverified). 31 August 2020: Che leaves the Zhejiang Party secretaryship. 27 September 2020: Chen Yu is sentenced to seven years — by which time Che has left office, and this file does not count it within his tenure. 17 October 2020: appointed deputy chairperson of the NPC Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee. 17 January 2023: elected a member of the 14th CPPCC National Committee; on 13 March, chairman of its Population, Resources and Environment Committee, a post he still holds (as checked in October 2026).

15. Verification notes

The verification method of this page is as follows. Career and appointment dates rest on Xinhua, People's Daily Online and other official reporting, cross-checked item by item against the Chinese and English Wikipedia entries; where accounts conflict, the official-reporting version is used and the fact noted in the text. Zhejiang religious cases were each checked for date against the start and end of Che Jun's tenure (governor from 4 July 2016; Party secretary from 26 April 2017 to 31 August 2020): any case whose key date falls outside the tenure is not counted as an in-tenure record, and such cases are listed together in section 11 (the cross-removal campaign of Xia Baolong's period, the Bao Guohua couple's sentencing, Chen Yu's sentencing, the Xinjiang internment camps, the designation of the Corps). Evidence of personal orders: within the scope of this site's search, no public record was found of Che Jun personally ordering the arrest, demolition or sentencing of any specific individual, and every attribution in this file is therefore one of institutional-chief responsibility — tenure, jurisdiction and executing system established as facts, personal instruction recorded as: no public record — the two are not conflated. Single-source material is marked under this site's rules: the disappearance of the fourteen Wenzhou house-church leaders (China Aid, single source), the Church of Almighty God's self-reported 2018 Zhejiang arrest figures (that organisation, single source), and the July 2020 Wenzhou cross removals (Bitter Winter, single source) are each marked "unverified" or carry their source status in the text, with qualifiers preserved. The scope and method of the sanctions check are set out in section 12, and its conclusion — no listing found — is warranted only for the stated scope and the October 2026 checking date. The Chinese authorities' accounts of the relevant events (that demolitions targeted illegal structures, that the cases were economic crimes, that the Regulations amount to lawful administration of religious affairs) are presented in each case's background in their own logic; this file's attributions rest on dates, institutions and the public record, not on any party's choice of label.

Contact: endccpworld@proton.me