The CECC 2025 Annual Report (10 December 2025): Promises Made, Promises Broken
This record documents the CECC 2025 Annual Report, released on 10 December 2025 by Chair Dan Sullivan and Cochair Chris Smith: eighteen chapters on Xinjiang forced labour, religious repression, Hong Kong and transnational repression, six priority bills, and 11,262 Political Prisoner Database records.
This page is currently available in Chinese and English only.
1. Introduction: an annual audit released on Human Rights Day
On 10 December 2025, International Human Rights Day, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China released its 2025 Annual Report in Washington. The release was issued by the Commission's Chair, Republican Senator Dan Sullivan, and its Cochair, Republican Representative Chris Smith. The report is produced under the statutory mandate of Title III of Public Law 106-286, the United States-China Relations Act of 2000, which created the Commission in 2000 and charged it with monitoring human rights and the development of the rule of law in China and reporting annually to the President and Congress. The 2025 edition was printed by the United States Government Publishing Office under stock number 58-857, with a cover marking the 119th Congress, First Session, December 2025. The full report and an executive summary were posted on the Commission's website the same day, the executive summary file being archived under 12 December 2025. This page records the release facts, structure, central findings and legislative recommendations of that document from the Commission's own press release, its executive summary and the congressional publication record, and distinguishes the page clearly from this site's existing general page on the State Department's human rights reports: that page describes an institution and its yearly practice in general, while this page records one specific document of one specific year.
The theme the report sets for itself is the key to all of its findings. Framed as Promises Made, Promises Broken, the report argues that the Chinese Communist Party makes solemn commitments at home and abroad and then governs as if those commitments were optional: fifty years of rights and an unchanged way of life promised to Hong Kong, autonomy promised to Uyghurs and Tibetans, constitutional protection promised for belief and speech, and pledges to the world on trade rules and international treaties, set against mass detention, omnipresent surveillance, tightening controls on religion and expression, and forced-labour goods entering global supply chains. In their foreword the two chairs wrote that broken promises are not an exception but a feature of how the Party deals with the world and with its own people. This page records that framework and those findings faithfully, while noting their nature: this is the official assessment of a bipartisan, bicameral commission of the United States Congress, representing the position of the American legislative branch, not a neutral academic conclusion. The Chinese government has consistently dismissed successive editions of these reports as interference in internal affairs that disregards the facts. The duty of an archive is to preserve the document's contents, evidence and recommendations in full so that later readers can judge for themselves.
2. The issuing body: what the CECC is
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created in 2000, at the moment China stood on the threshold of World Trade Organization membership, when Congress decided that granting China permanent normal trade relations should be paired with a standing body to monitor the country's human rights and rule-of-law record continuously. The Commission is composed of members of the Senate and the House together with executive-branch representatives. Its Chair and Cochair are drawn from the two chambers: the current Chair is Republican Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska and the Cochair is Republican Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey. Commissioners listed in the 2025 executive summary include Senators Tom Cotton, Jeff Merkley and Tammy Duckworth and Representatives Elise Stefanik, Zachary Nunn and Jen Kiggans, among others, and this page follows that 2025 roster. Beyond the annual report, the Commission holds hearings, issues statements on individual cases, and maintains a Political Prisoner Database. The release also noted that Secretary of State Marco Rubio served on the Commission as Chair or Ranking Member for nine years during his Senate career, a personnel link that explains part of the continuity between the Commission and the current administration on China human rights questions.
The report's scale and structure are as follows. Its main text runs to eighteen chapters recording human rights and rule-of-law conditions field by field inside China and in areas under its control, covering freedom of expression, religious freedom, ethnic minority rights, labour rights, population policy, criminal justice, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang, and carrying extensive recommendations to Congress and the executive branch. Its most distinctive evidentiary base, beyond press reporting and scholarship, is the Commission's own Political Prisoner Database. As of 30 June 2025 the database contained 11,262 records of political and religious prisoners in China, of which 2,755 were active detentions, meaning individuals known or believed to be currently detained, imprisoned or under coercive controls. The Commission concedes at the same time that the true figure is certainly higher. Binding an individual-case database to an annual report is what sets this document apart from ordinary diplomatic statements: many of its conclusions can be traced back to named, individual prisoners.
3. Finding one: the expansion of forced labour in Xinjiang
The report's Xinjiang findings concentrate on a change in the form of forced labour. It finds that authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region continue to expand coercive labour schemes involving Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, including transfers of people from traditional rural livelihoods into industrial work and the confiscation of land for state-run cooperatives and developers. In other words, the report concludes that Xinjiang's forced-labour system has not contracted under international sanctions and supply-chain scrutiny, but has evolved from labour inside internment camps into normalised transfer-employment structures that reach into rural land and employment itself. The finding connects with the follow-up concerns of the UN High Commissioner's 2022 Xinjiang assessment while differing in emphasis: the OHCHR assessment centred on arbitrary detention and torture allegations, whereas the 2025 CECC report centres on labour and land, arguing that coercion has seeped into the ordinary organisation of the economy. On that basis the report recommends stronger enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and closing loopholes in small-parcel and transshipment trade, detailed in the recommendations section of this page.
The report also records assimilation pressure in Tibet and Inner Mongolia: the mass expulsion of monks from Tibetan Buddhist institutions such as Larung Gar, the closure of Tibetan-language schools, and the case of language-rights advocate Gonpo Namgyal, who died in custody after torture according to the accounts of Tibetan rights organisations citing the report. The executive summary carries testimony from a Southern Mongolian activist on the declining share of ethnic Mongolians in the region's population and the erosion of their culture. In the report these materials stand alongside Xinjiang to form its complete picture on ethnic policy: the promise of autonomy hollowed out in three regions by three different methods. On the Gonpo Namgyal case this page records only what the report and citing organisations say; the details of his death have no independent official verification channel, and the text does not expand beyond the report's own framing.
4. Finding two: systematic repression of religious and ethnic communities
The report summarises the year's religious conditions as systematic repression. The Party tightened control over all major faiths, promoted the sinicization of religion, and suppressed Muslim, Tibetan Buddhist, Christian, Falun Gong and other communities through mosque rectifications, colonial-style boarding schools, intrusive surveillance and the persecution of groups labelled as cults. It records in particular a coordinated campaign led by United Front organs to tighten the governance of religion in 2025, including suppression of ethnic minority Muslim groups and mass arrests of Protestant leaders. Falun Gong continues to receive dedicated treatment, documenting continuing persecution and allegations of forced organ harvesting, which underpin the Commission's decision to list ending forced organ harvesting among its priority legislative directions. On Christianity the report records continuing lines of cases involving arrested house-church leaders and pressure on crosses and church buildings. Its judgement is that the gap between the constitutional text's promise of freedom of belief and a reality in which religious affairs are wholly subordinated to Party leadership widened further in 2025 rather than narrowing.
5. Finding three: the criminalisation of dissent and civil society
The report records that authorities arbitrarily detained human rights lawyers, labour organisers, journalists, women's rights advocates and others under vague offences such as picking quarrels and provoking trouble or separatism, often accompanied by torture, incommunicado detention and extralegal black jails. Citing China Dissent Monitor data, it notes that protest and dissent events rose by about twenty-seven per cent year on year between the July-to-September periods of 2023 and 2024, evidence of rising social discontent. The authorities' response, the report finds, was to expand the machinery of social control: the Central Society Work department established central and local branches in 2023 to strengthen control of society and suppress so-called illegal social organisations, and in 2025 the rules for banning such organisations were tightened further. The report names individual cases of artists and creators targeted for depicting sensitive subjects, including the artist Gao Zhen, whose work addressed the Cultural Revolution, and the Uyghur filmmaker Ikram Nurmehmet. The logic of this chapter connects directly to the report's theme: constitutional promises of association and expression have been displaced in practice by an institutional and criminal-law apparatus built specifically for suppression.
6. Finding four: the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy and rule of law
On Hong Kong the report concludes that national security laws continue to be weaponised to imprison pro-democracy leaders, shutter civil society and chill press freedom, in violation of obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong's Basic Law. At the time of release, national security cases against Hong Kong democrats and media figures were proceeding or concluded, and the executive summary used imagery of Apple Daily founder Jimmy Lai as the emblematic picture of its Hong Kong coverage. At the level of recommendations, the report makes Hong Kong a focus of sanctions enforcement, backing the Hong Kong Judicial Sanctions Act, which would impose targeted sanctions on judges and prosecutors responsible for undermining Hong Kong's autonomy and rule of law and for jailing political prisoners. Hong Kong is where the report's promise framework is most concrete: the fifty-years-unchanged pledge exists in treaty text, with a term and with witnessing parties, making Hong Kong the chapter in which promise and practice can be compared line by line most easily. This site's Hong Kong archives, including the Causeway Bay Books page, record evidence that this comparison was already available in 2015.
7. Finding five: technology-enhanced abuse and repression beyond China's borders
A marked novelty of the 2025 report is that it explicitly extends the geography of abuse beyond China's borders. A dedicated chapter, described by the chairs as a distinctive contribution of this year's report, documents human rights violations in the United States and globally: harassment of diaspora communities and rights advocates, bounties and threats against overseas activists, covert overseas police service stations, and United States law-enforcement cases involving unregistered agents of the People's Republic of China. The same chapter records attempts to cultivate foreign politicians and political aides, the spread of disinformation about United States elections, the leveraging of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices, and work inside the United Nations system to blunt scrutiny of abuses. Taken together, the report argues, these practices form part of a global strategy to intimidate and censor people on American soil, tilt politics and policy in Beijing's favour, and erode universal human rights standards. Its technology chapters record how artificial-intelligence tools, mass data platforms, satellite internet infrastructure and censorship technologies are embedded in Party policy and propaganda and exported abroad, enabling other governments to replicate China's model of digital repression. Transnational repression and the export of digital authoritarianism are the two lines along which the 2025 edition expands most visibly beyond earlier reports, and they correspond directly to the Commission's priority legislation on transnational repression.
8. Priority recommendations and the legislative list
The report makes a broad set of recommendations to Congress and the executive branch, and the chairs highlighted four priority areas in their release statement. First, confronting forced labour and tainted supply chains: strengthen enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, close loopholes in small-parcel and transshipment trade, and end imports of Chinese seafood caught or processed with forced labour, including on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing fleets and in processing plants relying on North Korean workers and transferred Uyghur workers. Second, freeing unjustly detained Americans in China: treat arbitrary prosecutions and exit bans as a form of hostage-taking, improve transparency in travel advisories, and deepen coordination with allies through a wrongful-detention working group. Third, ending forced organ harvesting: expand State Department reporting on organ trafficking, restrict organ tourism, impose visa bans and sanctions on perpetrators, and end United States funding and partnerships with Chinese institutions implicated in unethical transplant practices. Fourth, countering transnational repression and malign influence: develop a whole-of-government strategy, improve support for victims in diaspora communities, increase transparency around foreign interference in United States politics, and coordinate sanctions and law-enforcement tools with allies.
The priority bills named alongside the recommendations are recorded here exactly as the release lists them, for reference: the FISH Act, S. 688, targeting illegal fishing fleets and forced labour in the seafood industry; the Transnational Repression Policy Act, S. 2525 and H.R. 4829, building authorities, reporting and coordination against transnational repression; the Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act, S. 2560 and H.R. 4830, expanding sanctions and restricting federal procurement of goods linked to atrocity crimes; the Nelson Wells Jr. and Dawn Michelle Hunt Unjustly Detained in Communist China Act, H.R. 5491, enhancing tools to secure the release of unjustly detained Americans; the Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act, H.R. 1503, expanding reporting and authorities against forced organ harvesting and organ tourism; and the Hong Kong Judicial Sanctions Act, S. 1755 and H.R. 733, seeking targeted sanctions on judges and prosecutors who undermine Hong Kong's autonomy and jail political prisoners. At the time of release all of these bills were within the congressional process, and whether or when any of them passes is undetermined. This page records only the fact that they were listed as priorities and offers no prediction of legislative outcomes. Beyond the priority list, the report makes detailed recommendations on Tibet, on defeating the export of digital authoritarianism, on evaluating United States human rights diplomacy, and on public diplomacy.
9. Relation to existing records, and China's position
The place of this page within this site's International Official Record section requires explanation. The section already carries a general page on the China sections of the United States State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which describes that reporting institution as such. The CECC annual report is a parallel product of the congressional branch, with a different institution, a different mandate and a different format: State Department reports list facts country by country and rarely propose legislation, while CECC reports rest on a political prisoner database and submit bill lists directly to Congress. The 2025 edition, with its explicit thematic frame and priority legislative package, therefore receives its own page rather than being merged into the general one. The section previously had no dedicated page for a CECC annual report; this page is the first, and later editions may be continued into it by substantive update or given new pages, with the choice noted when it is made.
China's position on the Commission and its annual reports is consistent and explicit: Beijing holds that the Commission has been biased since its creation, that its reports disregard the progress of China's human rights cause and interfere in China's internal affairs, and that it does not accept them. This page records that position faithfully, while noting one checkable structural fact: most of the report's individual-case findings carry corresponding records in the Political Prisoner Database and public sourcing, and its conclusions on forced labour, Hong Kong national security enforcement and transnational repression overlap extensively with the records of United Nations bodies, other governments' reports and independent human rights organisations. Positions may differ; the degree of overlap between records can be checked. As of this page's latest review in November 2026, the Commission had not yet released a 2026 annual report. Following its established rhythm of year-end release, a new edition is expected around December 2026, and this page will be substantively updated when it appears, with the basis for the update noted.
10. Document index and verification note
The core official documents behind this page are as follows. First, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Annual Report 2025, 119th Congress, First Session, December 2025, Government Publishing Office stock number 58-857, with the full text and executive summary on the Commission's website, the executive summary archived under 12 December 2025. Second, the Commission's press release of 10 December 2025, Release of 2025 Annual Report Highlighting PRC's Broken Human Rights Promises, issued by Chair Sullivan and Cochair Smith: this page's thematic frame, five findings, Political Prisoner Database figures and every priority bill name and number were checked item by item against that release's original text. Third, the Library of Congress congressional publications record cataloguing the report as a joint publication of the 119th Congress. Fourth, the report's statutory basis, Title III of Public Law 106-286. Grading: the release date, the chairs' identities, the theme, the eighteen-chapter structure, the database figures of 11,262 records and 2,755 active detentions, and the priority bill numbers are Grade A, checked against the issuing body's own published text. Citations and interpretations of the report by organisations such as Tibetan rights groups are Grade B secondary relays, with sources noted in the text. Details of the Gonpo Namgyal case rest only on the report and citing organisations, with no independent official verification, and the text confines its wording accordingly. No single quotation exceeds fifty words.
11. Supplementary record: how this report builds its evidence
One further matter deserves separate record: the report's evidentiary method, because it determines how the document should be read. A CECC annual report is neither journalism nor academic research. Its material converges from three channels: open-source compilation by Commission research staff, sworn witness testimony at Commission hearings, and case records accumulated one by one in the Political Prisoner Database. The witness words woven through the executive summary, such as the Southern Mongolian activist's testimony on population and culture and the captions on mosques and surveillance, come from the formal record of the year's hearings and can be traced back by hearing date. The strength of this method is traceability: most cases in the report can be pinned to a name, a place of detention and a date. Its weakness is equally clear: the Commission's intake naturally favours cases that have already attracted international attention, detentions never reported anywhere do not enter the database, and the Commission itself concedes that 11,262 records fall below the true scale. The correct way to use this report is therefore as a floor, not a ceiling: what it proves is documented, and what it does not cover cannot be assumed not to exist. This site applies the same rule when citing it, attributing conclusions to the Commission, confining single-relay case details to qualified wording, and never silently converting the Commission's assessment into this site's independent finding.
Our Take
People say every year that a CECC annual report is only the American view, and the sentence is half right: it is indeed a document of the United States Congress, and it never hides its standpoint. The other half is that this one view contains 11,262 named prisoners, bill numbers that can be looked up one by one, and conclusions that can be set line by line against United Nations reports and European documents. What an authoritarian regime fears has never been being criticised; it is being recorded in enough detail that every allegation lands on a specific person, a specific prison and a specific year. By choosing broken promises as its theme, the 2025 report changes the question from whether you govern well to whether your own words still count. Beijing has never once answered that question directly. This archive keeps the report on file so that the question stays on the table.