Bu Xiaolin (1958–)
Bu Xiaolin is the granddaughter of Ulanhu, the founding chairman of Inner Mongolia, and the daughter of Buhe, another former chairman of the region. She chaired the Inner Mongolia regional government from 2016 to August 2021. In 2020, the government she led implemented the national unified-textbook policy: schools teaching in Mongolian switched the language-and-literature course to nationally compiled textbooks taught in Mandarin, with morality-and-rule-of-law and history to follow. The policy triggered the largest Mongolian class boycotts and protests in more than three decades. Her government answered with wanted lists, cash rewards for informants, mass detentions — the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center estimated 8,000 to 10,000 people were placed under some form of police custody — and reported deaths. In August 2021, Bu resigned the chairmanship and moved to a National People's Congress committee post.
Contents
- 1. Family and career: the third generation of the Ulanhu house
- 2. The policy: the August 2020 unified-textbook plan
- 3. Boycotts and protests: the largest in more than thirty years
- 4. The crackdown: wanted lists, rewards, detentions, and forced returns
- 5. Reported deaths: what is known and what is not
- 6. Bu Xiaolin and the regional government's public defense
- 7. Resignation and transfer
- 8. Responsibility and competing accounts
- Sources & further reading
1. Family and career: the third generation of the Ulanhu house
Bu Xiaolin was born in August 1958 in Tumed Left Banner, Inner Mongolia, an ethnic Mongol. Her grandfather Ulanhu founded the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and served as its first chairman, later becoming a Vice President of China. Her father Buhe chaired the Inner Mongolia government from 1983 to 1993 and later served as a Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. Three generations of one family at the head of Inner Mongolia is unique in CCP-ruled China. The family history matters for understanding 2020: Ulanhu was known for protecting Mongolian-language education, and the Mongolian-medium school system was built by his generation. The official who implemented the policy curtailing that system — and publicly defended it — was his granddaughter.
Bu's career began at the bottom: brief farm work at the end of the Cultural Revolution, then a medic at PLA Hospital No. 291 in the Inner Mongolia Military District (1977–1980). She entered Peking University's law department in 1980, graduated in economic law in 1984, taught briefly at Inner Mongolia University, and from 1985 climbed the regional government's legal-affairs ladder to head its legislative affairs office and serve as government secretary-general, earning a doctorate in law from Jilin University along the way. She became chief of Alxa League in 2004 and its Party Secretary in 2006, Vice Chairwoman of the region in 2008, and head of the regional United Front Work Department in 2014 — filling the vacancy left by Wang Suyi, who had fallen in a corruption case. On March 30, 2016, she was named acting chairwoman; on June 23 she was confirmed as chairwoman, the second woman to hold the office.
Sources: Wikipedia entry on Bu Xiaolin; People's Daily biography (June 2016); Phoenix News reporting on the Ulanhu family's three generations leading Inner Mongolia.
2. The policy: the August 2020 unified-textbook plan
The first leak came in June 2020, when a Ministry of Education inspector in Tongliao let slip that three subjects in ethnic schools would switch to national textbooks in the fall. On August 26, the Inner Mongolia education department formally issued the Implementation Plan for primary grade one and junior-high grade one in Mongolian-medium schools to use the nationally compiled language-and-literature textbooks. The rollout was phased: from September 1, 2020, the language-and-literature course (语文) in grade one of primary school and grade one of junior high switched to the national textbooks, taught in the national common language (Mandarin). The morality-and-rule-of-law course was to follow in autumn 2021, and history in autumn 2022, per the plan as described in the Chinese Wikipedia entry on the national textbooks and regional statements. Mongolian remained as a standalone subject, but the core subjects taught through Mongolian were to be removed one by one, starting with three.
Mongolian society's reaction was not about a single textbook. It was about direction. The ethnic-language education system built since 1947 taught subjects through Mongolian, with Chinese as a course; the new plan was widely read as the first step in inverting that structure — beginning with the three subjects carrying the heaviest ideological content: language, politics (morality and law), and history. Parents' fears were concrete: first-graders would face a national language textbook far more demanding than the old one, and Mongolian literacy would wither within a generation. As the news spread through WeChat groups in late August, online communities were shut down and teachers and parents were warned about discussing the issue. By the first day of school, the tension was already at breaking point.
Sources: Chinese Wikipedia entry on the nationally compiled textbooks (the August 2020 Inner Mongolia implementation plan); Deutsche Welle and Voice of America reporting on the curriculum change (September 2020).
3. Boycotts and protests: the largest in more than thirty years
From August 31, the protest took the form of a class boycott: large numbers of Mongolian parents refused to send their children to school. In Tongliao, Xilingol, Hohhot, Ordos, and elsewhere, classrooms stood empty on the first day of term. Parents retrieved children already delivered to boarding schools; crowds gathering at school gates were pushed back by police. Footage relayed by SMHRIC of students chanting "Defend Mongolian culture and language" became the movement's emblematic image. International media put participating students in the tens of thousands or more; one account relayed by Bitter Winter spoke of 300,000 students on strike — a figure that cannot be verified, and this entry records only what multiple outlets agreed on: a regionwide movement, and, in NPR's words, the largest demonstrations in Inner Mongolia in more than three decades.
The protest was deliberately peaceful: keeping children home, gathering at school gates, online petitions, and a joint statement by Mongolian staff of the regional broadcaster. The demand never changed: withdraw or suspend the textbook plan and preserve Mongolian-medium teaching. But the regional government never treated the affair as an education-policy dispute. From the start it handled the boycott as a political incident — and that choice is the hinge on which everything after turns.
Sources: National Public Radio (September 16, 2020); Voice of America (September 3, 2020); SMHRIC bulletins, August–September 2020.
4. The crackdown: wanted lists, rewards, detentions, and forced returns
In early September, Public Security Minister Zhao Kezhi personally traveled to Inner Mongolia for an emergency meeting, instructing the public security organs to uphold the Party's leadership unequivocally and to advance the "anti-secession struggle." Police bureaus across the region then published wanted and tip-off lists carrying surveillance-camera photographs of alleged organizers, offering a 1,000-yuan reward for information. Radio Free Asia reported on October 20, citing SMHRIC, that an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 ethnic Mongolians had been placed under some form of police custody since late August — arrests, detentions, disappearances, house arrests, and "intensive training." An earlier SMHRIC estimate in mid-September put the figure at 4,000 to 5,000. In Tongliao, rights lawyer Hu Baolong was detained with at least eight others on suspicion of "picking quarrels and stirring up trouble"; the activist Yang Jindulima was also held.
Pressure on parents ran through the administrative system: notices required parents to sign pledges to return their children to school, warning that children of non-compliant families would be expelled, that the family's herds and grazing arrangements would be inspected, and that parents in public employment would face consequences. Teachers and officials who refused to send their own children were reported suspended; one business owner's factory was reportedly damaged to pressure him (RFA reporting; not fully independently verified). Tongliao reportedly banned vehicles from the roads for four days to prevent parents from gathering. Within weeks the boycott collapsed under the pressure, and the children went back — to classrooms with new textbooks.
| Source | Figure | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| SMHRIC (via RFA, October 20, 2020) | 8,000–10,000 people | Placed under some form of police custody since late August: arrest, detention, disappearance, house arrest, "intensive training" combined |
| SMHRIC (mid-September 2020, via RFA) | 4,000–5,000 people | Arbitrary arrest, extrajudicial detention, forced disappearance, and house arrest combined |
| NPR and other international media (September 2020) | Hundreds | Parents and protesters named on wanted/tip-off lists supported by surveillance photographs |
| Chinese official sources | No total published | Only individual "rumor-mongering" case notices; authorities said most parents had been "misled" and "incited" |
Sources: Radio Free Asia (October 20 and September 14, 2020); NPR (September 16, 2020); Bitter Winter on Zhao Kezhi's Inner Mongolia trip (September 2020).
5. Reported deaths: what is known and what is not
Several deaths were reported during the protests. This entry grades each one. The most widely reported is the case of Surnaa: RFA reported on September 4, 2020, that a 33-year-old ethnic Mongolian woman who worked for a Party body in Alxa League had died that morning, with the league police issuing a statement that resuscitation had failed. Her husband and family, in a statement published by SMHRIC, said she had taken her own life over the language policy. Police simultaneously warned social-media users not to spread "rumors" about the cause of her death. Grading: her death is documented by the police statement; the link to the policy comes from her family's account alone and is not independently verified.
RFA's same report relayed activist Nomin's account of three earlier reported deaths: a fifth-grade student near Tongliao, a teacher in Zhenglan (Plain Blue) Banner, and a herder in Ongniud Banner. Other overseas reports mentioned a teacher in Zhenglan Banner and the husband of a teacher in Tongliao (Bitter Winter). The reports overlap, names and details are mostly incomplete, and none has been officially confirmed or independently investigated. This entry labels the whole set "widely relayed, not independently verified." They establish one thing only: death reports circulated broadly at the time and formed part of the atmosphere of fear. Whether they occurred, and how many there were, has never been credibly tallied.
Sources: Radio Free Asia (September 4, 2020), on the Surnaa case and the three earlier reports; Bitter Winter (September 2020).
6. Bu Xiaolin and the regional government's public defense
Bu's public role throughout was defender of the policy. At regional meetings around September 1, the line was set: "Our region is a model autonomous region; firmly implementing this policy is a major political task that we must fulfill" (as relayed by Reuters and other outlets from the regional meeting). That formulation elevated an education policy into a test of political loyalty — and closed off any space for the policy to be walked back. The official line never varied afterward: unified textbooks help ethnic students advance in education and employment; Mongolian is not being abolished and other subjects remain Mongolian-taught; the trouble arose because the change "had not been fully explained to parents" and because "disinformation misled the public" (the Global Times, quoting a Xilingol League government statement). As chairwoman, Bu headed the government that issued and executed this line. This entry found no record of her publicly addressing the scale of the detentions or the reported deaths at any point.
One further detail belongs in the record: on January 26, 2021, while delivering the government work report to the regional people's congress, Bu fainted mid-speech and the report had to be finished by another official. No official explanation was given. The incident proves nothing by itself, but its timing — four months after the protests were crushed, half a year before her resignation — invited speculation about the pressure she had been under that autumn. This entry records the fact and makes no medical or political inference.
Sources: Reuters reporting on the Inner Mongolia curriculum protests (September 2020), for the "model autonomous region" / "major political task" formulation; Global Times (September 2020); Lianhe Zaobao (January 27, 2021) on the fainting incident.
7. Resignation and transfer
On August 5, 2021, the regional people's congress standing committee accepted Bu Xiaolin's resignation as chairwoman; Wang Lixia succeeded her as acting chair. No reason was given. On August 20, Bu was appointed a vice chairperson of the NPC Environment Protection and Resources Conservation Committee — a standard posting for officials moving to the second line. By then the morality-and-rule-of-law textbooks were rolling out on schedule in the autumn term, and history was set to follow in 2022: the policy was implemented in full, subject by subject, while the official who had implemented it quietly exited. After the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Bu's public activity effectively ceased.
The language environment continued to tighten afterward. Testimony recorded by the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China describes the removal of Mongolian signage, restrictions on Mongolian publications, and a regionwide "common identity" training program for the education system launched in December 2020, to be completed in three phases by the end of March 2021. These developments fall at the end of Bu's tenure and after it; this entry records them as the policy's continuation, not as new decisions by her personally.
Sources: Xinhua and The Paper personnel announcements (August 2021); Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing testimony, via the Library of Congress (language and identity constraints in Inner Mongolia).
8. Responsibility and competing accounts
The chain of responsibility: The national framework for unified textbooks came from the Ministry of Education, but the Inner Mongolia implementation plan was drawn up and issued by the education department of Bu's government, and the school reopening, the information controls, the wanted lists and detentions, and the pressure campaign to return children to class were all executed by regional authorities during her chairmanship. She was also deputy Party chief of the region, sitting at the decision point of both the Party and government lines. "The policy came from the Center" is true; it does not cover the manner of enforcement — treating parents' protests as a political incident, threatening herder families with expulsion of their children and inspection of their herds, and publishing wanted lists built from surveillance photographs were regional-level choices, and as head of the regional government Bu cannot escape them.
Beijing's account: Nationally compiled textbooks implement national law and promote educational equity, helping ethnic students succeed; the Mongolian language course is retained and the ethnic-language system is not being abolished; the unrest resulted from poor communication, foreign incitement, and rumors.
Mongolian society and overseas rights groups: SMHRIC argued the policy aims to remove Mongolian from the education system within years and described the repression as mass arbitrary detention; solidarity rallies were held in Mongolia itself. The parents' core demand throughout was a choice in education: that their children learn core subjects in their mother tongue.
This archive's observation: The sharpest feature of Bu Xiaolin's case is the contrast between family and policy. The autonomy her family administered for three generations rested nominally on ethnic regional autonomy and minority-language rights. The 2020 policy narrowed exactly those rights — and the person who defended it and presided over the crackdown was the family's third-generation head. Whatever her private views, the archive records what she did: in office, issued, defended, suppressed, departed.
Sources & further reading
- Wikipedia entry on Bu Xiaolin; People's Daily biography (family background, career, tenure dates)
- Chinese Wikipedia entry on the nationally compiled textbooks (the August 2020 Inner Mongolia plan and the three-subject rollout schedule)
- Radio Free Asia: September 4, 2020 (the Surnaa case); October 20, 2020 (SMHRIC's 8,000–10,000 estimate); September 14, 2020
- National Public Radio, September 16, 2020 (Tongliao vehicle ban, wanted lists, return-to-school pressure)
- Voice of America, September 3, 2020 (the boycott and the policy's content)
- Reuters, September 2020 (the regional meeting's "major political task" formulation)
- Global Times, September 2020 (official line: Mongolian not abolished; unrest caused by misleading information)
- Bitter Winter, September 2020 (Zhao Kezhi's Inner Mongolia trip; the 1,000-yuan reward)
- Lianhe Zaobao, January 27, 2021 (Bu fainting while delivering the government work report)
- Xinhua and The Paper personnel announcements, August 2021 (resignation; NPC committee appointment)
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing testimony (Mongolian signage, publications, and education training after 2020)
Contact: endccpworld@proton.me