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China: Archive of Communist Crimes & Victims
ARCHIVE / MEMORY / EVIDENCE

让历史被看见
让受害者被铭记
Let History Be Seen
Let Victims Be Remembered

Suppression of Falun Gong (1999–)

From July 1999 the CCP crushed Falun Gong: the 610 Office, labor camps, torture, "transformation." The 2001 Tiananmen self-immolation and organ-harvesting allegations are highly disputed; both sides presented here.

Time
July 20, 1999 – present
Place
Nationwide; labor camps, prisons, "transformation classes"
Decision-makers
Jiang Zemin (overall); Li Lanqing, Luo Gan (execution); the 610 Office (dedicated agency)

Contents

Background: qigong boom and April 25

In the 1990s China caught "qigong fever." In 1992 Li Hongzhi founded Falun Gong, preaching "truthfulness, compassion, forbearance," quickly gaining huge followings — officially once estimated at 70 million (disputed, unverified), exceeding CCP membership, alarming the leadership.

On April 25, 1999, over 10,000 practitioners petitioned near Zhongnanhai for the release of detained Tianjin practitioners and the right to practice. Zhu Rongji met representatives; it ended peacefully. But Jiang Zemin deemed it a grave political incident and resolved to crush it.

Who decided

Jiang Zemin was the supreme decision-maker. April 25, 1999: 10,000+ peaceful petitioners; Premier Zhu Rongji met them and agreed — then Jiang wrote the Politburo that night: "Communists must defeat Falun Gong." June 7: Jiang called it "an unprecedented serious threat." June 10: the 610 Office was established — an "extrajudicial security apparatus" (US CECC). July 20 (dawn): nationwide arrests; July 22: the ban and "six prohibitions." October 30: the NPC anti-cult decision.

Who decided

Jiang Zemin (then General Secretary) was the supreme decision-maker. Key decisions:

Detailed timeline

June 10, 1999: The "610 Office" (named for its date) was created to crush Falun Gong, above the law.

July 20, 1999: Nationwide roundups began. On July 22 the Ministry of Civil Affairs outlawed Falun Gong.

October 30, 1999: The NPC Standing Committee passed the anti-"evil cult" decision.

2000–2001: Mass petitions in Beijing met labor camp and prison. After the January 23, 2001 "Tiananmen self-immolation," the crackdown intensified.

March 5, 2002: Changchun practitioners hijacked TV signals to air their message; heavy sentences followed (Liu Chengjun et al., 10–20 years).

2006: Lawyer Gao Zhisheng and Canadians David Matas released organ-harvesting investigation reports.

2013: Labor camps abolished, but "transformation classes" and imprisonment continued.

2018: The 610 Office merged into the Political-Legal Committee.

2024: The US Congress advanced the Falun Gong Protection Act.

Who executed

Chain: Jiang → the 610 Office → 610 offices at all levels → security, labor camps, prisons, courts, propaganda. The "transformation" system: forced renunciation in labor camps, prisons and "legal education centers" — tiger benches, electric batons, "dead-person beds," sleep deprivation, force-feeding. The UN torture rapporteur found 66% of torture victims were practitioners. The US State Department (2008) cited estimates that half of 250,000 labor-camp detainees were practitioners.

Who executed

Execution chain: Jiang Zemin → the Central Leading Group/610 Office → 610 offices at all levels → public security, state security, labor camps, prisons, courts, propaganda.

Dispute 1: Tiananmen self-immolation (2001)

Official claim

On January 23, 2001, seven practitioners self-immolated in Tiananmen Square; one died on the spot. CCTV aired footage blaming Li Hongzhi's "ascension" preaching. Public opinion swung behind the crackdown.

Skeptics' rebuttal

Practitioners say the immolators were not genuine (tenets forbid suicide), citing CCTV flaws (e.g., Liu Chunling beaten to death, not burned). The IED called it "staged" at the UN.

Unverified

Independent investigation impossible; truth hotly disputed and unverifiable.

Three columns — highly disputed, unverifiable.

Dispute 2: organ-harvesting allegations

September 3, 2025 hot-mic incident (verified public record): during Beijing's military parade, a CCTV livestream hot mic caught Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin discussing organ transplantation and longevity. Putin's translator: "Human organs can be continuously transplanted. The longer you live, the younger you become, and (you can) even achieve immortality." Xi (off camera): "Some predict that in this century humans may live to 150 years old." Putin later confirmed it. CCTV pressured Reuters to withdraw the video. DAFOH issued an alarmed statement September 10, 2025. (Sources: Reuters; DAFOH.) Presented as public record.

Dispute 2: organ-harvesting allegations

Allegation

From 2006, Canada's David Kilgour and David Matas reported the CCP harvesting practitioners' organs. In 2019 the UK's China Tribunal ruled forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience occurred, with Falun Gong practitioners the main victims.

Denial

China denies it, saying transplants were regularized and death-row organs abandoned from 2015.

Unverified

Accusers rely on testimony, phone probes and data analysis; Beijing bars independent probes. Truth cannot be independently verified.

Presented in three columns — highly disputed.

Scale & methodology

SourceFigureNote
Falun Gong sourcesThousands persecuted to deathNamed cases via Minghui etc.; Beijing rejects.
OfficialNo systematic figureClaims "education and transformation"; denies mass deaths.
Labor camp detaineesHundreds of thousands (est.)Practitioners were a huge share of camp inmates in the early 2000s; camps abolished 2013.
Note: Archives closed. Death tolls rest entirely on Falun Gong tallies, unverifiable; organ allegations equally disputed. Honestly flagged.

Who opposed

In-party: Qiao Shi's investigation concluded "a hundred benefits, not a single harm"; Zhu Rongji was accused of being "too soft"; Beijing lawyers' "Constitution Supreme, Belief Innocent" defense (2007). Practitioners: peaceful appeals and truth-clarification. International: US House resolutions, the 2026 Senate Falun Gong Protection Act, European Parliament resolutions, UN experts' 2021 joint statement, Spanish/Argentine indictments (2009).

Who opposed

1. In-party dissenters:

2. Practitioners' peaceful resistance: the April 25 appeal itself — 10,000+ quiet, orderly, no slogans, cleaning up litter before leaving; continued petitions and Tiananmen appeals after the ban; "truth-clarification" worldwide.

3. International opposition: US House resolutions (2004, 2010, 2016), Secretary Blinken's 2021 sanctions on Chengdu's ex-610 chief, the Senate's September 28, 2026 Falun Gong Protection Act; European Parliament resolutions (2013, 2016, 2024); the UN Committee Against Torture (2015) and 12 independent experts' joint statement (June 14, 2021); Spanish and Argentine courts' genocide indictments (2009).

Impact

The 610 Office's "state within a state." Above police, prosecutors and courts, it pioneered the "special-case" stability-maintenance model later used on rights lawyers and dissidents.

International human-rights issue. The crackdown became a core Western criticism of China; the US Falun Gong Protection Act, EU resolutions keep up pressure.

Media and truth. Practitioners founded Epoch Times and NTDTV, major overseas Chinese anti-CCP outlets (their stance and methods also disputed).

Archive supplement: the Tianjin incident, the "transformation" system and the battle of numbers

The immediate trigger: Tianjin, April 1999. The road to July 1999 began with a magazine article. In April 1999 He Zuoxiu, a prominent physicist and member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, published a piece in a Tianjin youth science magazine attacking Falun Gong by name and warning young people against practising it. From April 19 to 23, thousands of practitioners went peacefully to the magazine's offices to ask for a correction — a standard right of reply, as they saw it, that had worked in similar disputes before. On April 23 Tianjin riot police cleared the gathering and made arrests: forty-five people, by Falun Gong's account; the Tianjin authorities published no figure. Practitioners later recounted that officials told them Beijing alone could resolve the matter. From the evening of April 24, practitioners from Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and beyond converged on the capital. By dawn on April 25, more than ten thousand of them stood in quiet rows along Fuyou Street, outside the State Council's appeals office immediately west of Zhongnanhai — no banners, no chanting, no traffic blocked. Premier Zhu Rongji came out in the early morning, spoke with practitioners on the pavement and later received their representatives inside. That evening Tianjin released its detainees, the crowd went home, and foreign correspondents noted that the protesters had left the street cleaner than they found it, collecting even the cigarette ends dropped by watching police. Practitioners remember April 25 as a lawful, peaceful appeal that the Premier had resolved in a day. Jiang Zemin read the same event as proof of an organization that could assemble ten thousand people at the seat of power overnight and unnoticed. That night he wrote to the Politburo that Falun Gong must be "defeated" — and the machinery described on this page began to move.

The ban in operation. In the early hours of July 20, 1999, public security officers across China moved simultaneously, arresting the volunteer coordinators of local practice sites and other leading practitioners in a single coordinated night. On July 22 the Ministry of Civil Affairs formally outlawed the Falun Dafa Research Society and the movement itself, and the public security authorities published a list of prohibitions covering assembly, publication and "superstitious" activity. In the months that followed, Falun Gong books, tapes and portraits were confiscated on a national scale and publicly burned or pulped in many cities; state television devoted itself to denunciation; work units held criticism sessions; and practitioners were pressed one by one — as employees, as party members, as pensioners — to sign statements renouncing the practice. On July 29 a wanted notice was issued for Li Hongzhi, who had emigrated to the United States in 1996. In the campaign's first years, practitioners who travelled to Beijing to appeal — many of them elderly, many going again and again after each release — were intercepted, returned to their home towns and commonly sentenced to re-education through labour: up to three years, extendable, imposed by a police committee without charge, trial or defence lawyer. The labour camps, not the courts, were the workhorse of the suppression, and practitioners at their peak formed a very large share of the camp population.

How "transformation" worked. The campaign's central metric was "transformation" — a practitioner's signed renunciation, usually a set of statements: a guarantee not to practise, a repentance letter, a denunciation of Li Hongzhi. Human-rights organizations and academic researchers have documented how local 610 offices and work units were set transformation quotas and assessed against them, with officials' careers tied to the numbers. To meet them, localities across China ran what were officially called "legal education study classes": brainwashing centres in schools, hotels, factories and purpose-built compounds, where practitioners sent by their employers or neighbourhood committees were held indefinitely — no charge, no court, no release date — and subjected to round-the-clock pressure, sleep deprivation, forced viewing of denunciation videos and the constant attendance of "helpers," until they signed. Refusal meant escalation: labour camp, prison, dismissal from employment, loss of housing or pension, and pressure applied through spouses and children. The archive preserves named cases to stand for the system. Gao Rongrong, an accountant at a Shenyang art college, was beaten and shocked with electric batons for seven hours at Longshan labour camp in 2004, leaving her face severely disfigured; smuggled photographs of her injuries reached the outside world and drew international attention. Seized again in 2005 after officials moved to silence the case, she died in custody that June, aged thirty-seven. Zhao Xin, a lecturer at a Beijing business university, died in 2000 after custody beatings fractured the vertebrae in her neck. And in 2012 a woman in Oregon, opening a box of Halloween decorations bought at a discount store, found inside a handwritten English letter from Shenyang's Masanjia labour camp — "Sir: if you occasionally buy this product, please kindly resend this letter to the World Human Right Organization" — written by a practitioner named Sun Yi, who after his release confirmed the letter was his, fled China, and died in Indonesia in 2017.

The death toll: two different kinds of number. No figure on this page is more fiercely contested, and the sourcing must therefore be exact. Falun Gong's Minghui website has for more than two decades recorded deaths one case at a time — name, home town, detention site, reported circumstances — and its cumulative total of practitioners reported persecuted to death has passed five thousand. Those records cannot be verified case by case, because no independent investigator can work inside China; international media and human-rights organizations accordingly cite them with attribution, as "according to Falun Gong sources." The Chinese government maintains that practitioners who died did so chiefly by refusing medical treatment in obedience to Li Hongzhi's teachings, and accuses Falun Gong of inventing its toll. Independent third-party material supports only limited conclusions: Manfred Nowak, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported after his 2005 visit to China that Falun Gong practitioners accounted for roughly two-thirds of the torture allegations registered with his mandate — a finding about the pattern of allegations, not a death count. This page's rule follows from all of that: named cases are documented allegations that warrant investigation; the aggregate figure is always printed with its source and method, and never stated as independently established fact.

Organ harvesting: completing the timeline. Three further points belong beside the dispute section above. In 2016 David Kilgour, David Matas and the journalist Ethan Gutmann published an updated investigation arguing, from Chinese hospitals' own published data — transplant volumes, bed counts, surgical teams, waiting times measured in weeks where Western systems measure years — that the true scale of transplant activity in China was far larger than official statistics admitted, and that the gap implied a large pool of prisoners whose organs were available on demand. Critics have questioned their extrapolations; Beijing calls the data fabricated. In 2019 the China Tribunal, an independent people's tribunal sitting in London under the chairmanship of Sir Geoffrey Nice KC — the prosecutor of Slobodan Milošević — heard doctors, researchers and former detainees over two sets of hearings and concluded that forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience "has been practised for a substantial period of time in substantial numbers" in China, and that Falun Gong practitioners were "probably" a main source of organs, while noting the evidence concerning Uyghurs was still developing. In June 2021 a group of United Nations human-rights experts issued a joint statement declaring themselves "extremely alarmed" by credible allegations of organ harvesting targeting Falun Gong practitioners and other detained minorities, and calling on China to allow independent international monitoring. Beijing rejects the allegations in their entirety, has always refused such monitoring, and dismisses the tribunal as a Falun Gong-funded farce. Both positions are recorded on this page in full, because the defining fact of the dispute is this: the allegations carry the support of an independent tribunal and of UN experts, and at the same time no outside body has ever been permitted to verify conditions on the ground. That is precisely what the label "unverified" means here — not "disbelieved," but incapable, under present conditions, of proof.

Litigation, legislation and the present day. Practitioners and their supporters carried the campaign into foreign courts. In 2009 Spain's National Court opened an investigation into Jiang Zemin and other senior officials for torture and crimes against humanity, a case later shelved after Spain narrowed its universal-jurisdiction law; the same year an Argentine federal judge ordered the arrest of Jiang Zemin and Luo Gan, an order that was never executed. Symbolic as they were, the cases established the pattern of transnational litigation that practitioners have pursued ever since. Legislative pressure followed the same arc: the Falun Gong Protection Act, aimed principally at visa bans and asset sanctions against those complicit in forced organ harvesting, passed the United States House of Representatives in 2024 and the Senate in September 2026. Inside China, the 610 Office was in 2018 nominally merged into the party's Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the public security apparatus — a bureaucratic absorption, not an abolition; the functions, personnel and quotas continued under other names. Minghui continues to record several hundred practitioners sentenced to prison each year, and arrests around sensitive dates remain routine. A suppression that began on a July night in 1999 has now lasted more than a quarter of a century. It is the longest-running event in this archive, and the only one that is still, today, in progress.

The Changchun television interception (2002). On the evening of March 5, 2002, the signals of several channels on the Changchun cable television network were cut into and replaced, for some forty to fifty minutes, with Falun Gong programming — a film celebrating the movement's spread around the world and a point-by-point rebuttal of the official account of the Tiananmen self-immolation — reaching tens of thousands of households in a single city. It remains the boldest single act of "truth-clarification" of the entire campaign, a brief seizure of the state's own loudest megaphone. A citywide sweep followed: Falun Gong sources report that several thousand practitioners in the Changchun area were detained in the weeks afterwards, and the principal participants in the interception, including Liang Zhenxing and Liu Chengjun, received sentences of more than ten years. Liu Chengjun died in a Jilin prison in December 2003, aged thirty-two. Falun Gong sources state that he had been severely tortured and could no longer walk before his death; the authorities attributed his death to illness. Both accounts are recorded here, and this page draws no conclusion on the cause of death, which cannot now be independently established.

Gao Zhisheng: from defence lawyer to disappeared man. The suppression eventually consumed the lawyer who had defended its victims. Gao Zhisheng, a Beijing attorney once officially celebrated as one of China's ten best lawyers, investigated the persecution in 2004–05 and addressed three open letters to the country's leaders, the third titled "We Must Immediately Stop the Barbarian Onslaught That Is Extinguishing Our Nation's Conscience and Morality," documenting torture cases in detail and demanding that the campaign end. His law firm was shut down; in 2006 he was convicted of inciting subversion, given three years suspended for five, and during the suspension was repeatedly abducted and held incommunicado — a memoir that later reached the outside world describes his torture in harrowing detail, presented here as his own account, not independently verified. Released in 2014 to effective house arrest in his home village in Shaanxi, Gao escaped his watchers briefly in August 2017 with supporters' help, was recaptured, and has not been verifiably seen since. His name stands on the disappeared lists of the United Nations and of several governments. That the advocate who took up Falun Gong's case should himself end among the disappeared is the starkest single footnote to a campaign now running into its third decade.

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Sources

  1. Kilgour & Matas, Bloody Harvest
  2. China Tribunal judgment (2019)
  3. Human Rights Watch reports
  4. Chinese Wikipedia